Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 49

Issue 4

Article 6

1999

The Exception that Swallowed the Rule? Women's Medical
Professional Corporation v. Voinovich and the Mental Health
Exception to Post-Viability Abortion Bans
Brian D. Wassom

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brian D. Wassom, The Exception that Swallowed the Rule? Women's Medical Professional Corporation v.
Voinovich and the Mental Health Exception to Post-Viability Abortion Bans, 49 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 799
(1999)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol49/iss4/6

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

COMMENTS

THE EXCEPTION THAT SWALLOWED
THE RULE? WOMEN'S MEDICAL
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION V.
VOINOVICH AND THE MENTAL

HEALTH EXCEPTION TO POSTVIABILITY ABORTION BANS

I. INTRODUCTION

No legal question is ever truly "settled" in the abortion context.
Roe v. Wade2 itself continues to be lauded, lambasted and reinterpreted twenty-six years after it was decided. But until recently, one
aspect of the Roe holding has received comparatively little attention:
that a state's decision to regulate or ban abortions after a fetus becomes viable (in Roe's terms, in the third trimester)4 is subject to exception when the "life or health of the mother ' 5 is at stake. While this
is perhaps the least controversial aspect of Roe, increased debate has
recently ensued over exactly what the word "health" entails.
Health has generally been construed broadly in the abortion context. Doe v. Bolton,6 Roe's companion case, seemed to suggest that
1 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998).
2410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874-76 (1992) (plurality
opinion co-authored by O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (replacing Roe's trimester framework with an "undue burden" standard); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
517-19 (1989) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing that Roe's trimester system should
be abandoned and upholding Missouri's statutory declaration that life begins at conception).
4 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 313 (1980) (noting that under Roe, viability usually
occurs around the beginning of the third trimester).
5 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
6 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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the word "health" encompassed the entire spectrum of well-being,
including "physical, emotional, psychological, familial [health], and
the woman's age,"7 as viewed by the woman's physician. Taken literally, however, this interpretation appears to negate Roe's recognition of a state's compelling interest in preserving viable fetal life. Instead, it would seem to empower a doctor, whether a physician or
psychiatrist, to make an unreviewable decision to permit an abortion
whenever the doctor sees fit on grounds that are only arguably medical.
This expansive exception, however, is not the only plausible
reading of the rule in Doe and its predecessor, United States v.
Vuitch. The Court's reaffirmation of the state interest in fetal life in
PlannedParenthoodof South EasternPennsylvania v. Casey9 and the
lingering national unease generated by the "partial birth abortion"
debate, may result in a rethinking of what "health" means in the postviability context.
Specifically, lawmakers and jurists have begun to ask, "must a viable fetus be aborted purely for the sake of the mother's mental
health?" In 1997, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit answered in the
affirmative in Women's Medical Professional Corporationv. Voinovich.10 In their 1998 dissent to a denial of certiorari in that case, however, three Supreme Court Justices indicated their willingness to answer this question in the negative.1 ' In doing so, they join a rising
trend of national sentiment in favor
of narrowing the health exception
12
to post-viability abortion bans.
Although only a distinct minority of abortions are performed late
in pregnancy, the role of doctors in applying the health exception is
likely to increase. The Supreme Court has become increasingly tolerant of regulations that narrow the availability of abortion in some
situations.' 3 Federal courts, however, have been wary to uphold such
laws unless they contain an unambiguous health exception-one that,
in the view of many courts, must allow doctors almost limitless discretion to determine what "health" means in any given context. Thus,
Id. at 192.
8402 U.S. 62 (1971).
9505 U.S. 833 (1992).
10See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 210 (6th Cir. 1997).
11See Voinovich v. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1347, 1348 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
12 See Groups Try to Devalue Mind Ills as Reason for Allowing Procedure, FtLTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 7, 1999, available in NEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (describing limitation of the mental health exception as playing "a central role in the abortion debate").
13See John D. Lantos, M.D., et a., Abortion: EthicalIssuesfor Clinicians,in PSYCHIATRIC
ASPECTS OF ABORTION 202 (Nada L. Stotland, M.D. ed., 1991).
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the decision on how health is to be defined and weighed against comby physipeting constitutional interests will be one
14 increasingly made
professionals.
health
mental
cians and
This Comment explores the arguments on both sides of the postviability mental health exception debate. Voinovich is used as a
starting point in a discussion of the legal and policy concerns raised
by the "health" definition. Because this subject has received little
scholarly attention, this Comment does not seek a definitive answer
so much as it will attempt to properly frame the questions that must
be addressed. Nevertheless, after examining the legal and medical
bases for a mental health exception, this Comment argues that the
exception is unnecessary, and can only serve to undermine the compelling state interests in health and fetal life.
Part II traces the history of Voinovich, as it relates to the postviability mental health exception. The Voinovich dissenters in both
the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a mental health exception for post-viability abortions is constitutionally required. Part III analyzes whether the dissenters were correct as a legal matter. While Doe and Vuitch did not squarely rule on the matter,
their treatment by subsequent courts indicates that a broad definition
of health is at least the de facto law of the land. A reinterpretation of
these decisions has strong constitutional support, but such a shift will
require a decision by the Supreme Court to effectuate. Finally, Part
IV illustrates the policy arguments for and against a formal mental
health exception, and how any such exception might be implemented
in practice. Especially in the context of post-viability abortions, this
Comment argues that abortion is at best an ineffectual treatment for
mental health disorders, and that the possible side-effects to late
abortion have been completely ignored by most courts and policymakers. Additionally, Part IV compares the mental health justifications to the countervailing state interests, and highlights new facets of
the states' interest that have been suggested by Voinovich and other
recent cases. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that Voinovich was
an ill-informed and misguided decision. Policy makers and especially
the Supreme Court should explicitly limit the post-viability health
exception to physical health, so as to safeguard both the woman and
the states' compelling interest in the life of a viable fetus.

14See

id.
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IX. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF VOINOVICH V. WOMEN'S
MEDICAL
15
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

The Voinovich story began in 1995 with Ohio's adoption of
House Bill 135 (the "Bill").' 6 This would be the first 7 in a series

of nationwide measures aimed at abolishing "brain suction abor-

tion, ' 18 a procedure that would soon come to be known alternatively as "partial birth abortion," "Dilation and Extraction" ("D &

X"), or "Intact Dilation and Evacuation" ("Intact D & "). '9
A. The Bill
The Bill was passed on August 16, 1995,20 and signed into law the
next day by then-Governor George V. Voinovich.2 1 Initially introduced as a simple ban on "brain suction abortion,"22 the final, compromise act contained three separate provisions: 23 (1) a ban on the use
of the D & X procedure; 24 (2) a ban on post-viability abortions, exIS 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998).
16 H.B.

135, 121st Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2307.51 et seq., 2919.15 et seq. (Anderson 1998)).
17See Sandy Theis, Voinovich Signs Welfare, Abortion Measures; Ban on Specific Procedure a First,CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 17, 1995, at C08.
18 id.
19Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d. 187, 198-99 (6th Cir. 1997).
20 See Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1056-57 (S.D. Ohio
1995).

21See Lee Leonard, Voinovich Signs Bill Limiting Abortions, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug.

17, 1995, at IC.
22 See id. (summarizing the legislative history of House Bill 135).
23See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1057.
24 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(B) (Anderson 1998). House Bill 135 defined D &
X as "the termination of a human pregnancy by purposely inserting a suction device into the
skull of the fetus to remove the brain. 'Dilation and extraction procedure' does not include
either the suction curettage procedure of abortion or the suction aspiration procedure of abortion." Id. § 2919.15(A). It should be noted that this definition differs significantly from the one
contained in the twice-passed, twice-vetoed, federal legislation on partial birth abortion. See
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). That Act
defined the procedure as "an abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery." Id. The
Sixth Circuit explicitly disavowed any application of its decision to that definition. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 199 n.9. Indeed, had Ohio's bill been more specifically tailored to the procedure it sought to ban, it may not have been stricken-at least not on vagueness grounds.
In keeping with what has become the accepted medical terminology, this Comment usually
refers to the procedure as "D & X." See Janet E. Gans Epner, PhD. et al., Late-Term Abortion,
280 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 729 (1998). It should be noted, however, that although the term "partial
birth abortion" is "unscientific," id., and obviously coined to be inflammatory, it is nonetheless
an accurate description of the procedure. See National Right to Life Committee ("NRLC"), Is
There a More Objective Term for the Procedure? (visited Oct. 8, 1998)
<http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/pbafactl4.html> (quoting Dr. Martin Haskell as calling the procedure "somewhat equivalent to a breech type delivery").
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cept when a physician determines in "good faith and in the exercise of
reasonable medical judgement [that the abortion is] necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the
pregnant woman,"5 and the doctor follows a list of procedures; 26 and
(3) a requirement that any fetus over twenty-two weeks of gestational
age27 be tested for viability before being aborted.2 8 The judicial
treatment of the second provision is the focus of this Comment.
The Bill was unique in that one of its justifications was to prevent
cruelty to the fetus.2 9 The Bill also contained a rebuttable presumption of viability at twenty-four weeks.3 ° Violation of the provisions of
the Bill constituted a fourth degree felony,31 punishable by up to
eighteen months imprisonment and a $2,500 fine. 32 Doctors also
faced potential civil liability for punitive and compensatory damages.33
The Bill passed both the Ohio House and Senate by overwhelming
majorities. 34 A facial challenge to the law's constitutionality under
Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights was filed on October 27, 1995,
The Plaintiffs were
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.35
Women's Medical Professional Corp., a chain of abortion clinics operating in three Ohio counties, and Dr. Martin Haskell,36 an affiliated
37
abortion provider who claims to have coined the term "D & X.,,

2

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(A)(1) (Anderson 1998).

26 Under the Bill, the physician must certify in writing that the health exception applied,

obtain the written concurrence of at least one other physician, perform the abortion in a facility
with neonatal services for premature infants, use the method least harmful to the fetus, and
arrange for the attendance of another physician during the procedure to take all reasonable steps
to preserve the expelled fetus's life. See id. § 2919.17(B)(1)(a)-(e).
27Gestational age is defined as the length of time from the first day of the last menstrual period of the pregnant woman. See id. § 2919.16(B).
2SSee id.§ 2919.18.
29 See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1071-72 (S.D. Ohio
1995). According to the district court, this was the first act to cite prevention of cruelty to the
fetus as a state interest. See id. at 1072.
30 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(C) (Anderson 1998).
3' See id § 2919.17(D).
32 See Theis, supranote 17, at COS.
33 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.52(B) (Anderson 1998).
34 See Catherine Candisky, Ohio To Have FirstBan on Abortion Procedure, COLUMBUS
June 29, 1995, at 5D.
DISPATCH,
35
See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 1997).
36
See id at 191-92.
37 See 142 CONG. REc. E1743, E1748 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Douglas
Johnson, NRLC Federal Legislative Director).
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B. The DistrictCourt Decision: Women's Medical
Professional
38
Corporation v. Voinovich
After two days of hearings, Judge Walter Rice of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio issued a temporary restraining
order on the Bill's enforcement on November 13, 1995, one day before it would have taken effect. 39 After four more days of testimony,
the court issued a preliminary injunction.4 °
1. The Post-ViabilityAbortion Ban
The Plaintiffs challenged seven aspects of the post-viability abortion ban:41 (1) the viability testing requirement, (2) the scope of the
health exception, (3) the scope of the "medical emergency" exception,
(4) the second physician concurrence requirement, (5) the requirement that the method chosen be least dangerous to the fetus, (6) the
second physician attendance requirement, and (7) the viability presumption. The court would side with the Plaintiffs on all but the last
of these components.
Beginning the controversy that is the focus of this Comment 4 2 the
health exception was found invalid because it failed to cover impairment of mental health.43 To illustrate the term "substantial and irre38911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
39See id. at 1056-57.
40See id. at 1057.
41See id. at 1076.
42 It should be noted that Voinovich could serve as a starting point for a number of other apropos legal discussions as well. For example, both the district court and the Sixth Circuit applied a different standard of review for facial constitutional standards than has traditionally been
applied. In Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
the Court sustained part of a facial challenge because "in a large fraction of the cases in which
[the provision at issue] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice
to undergo an abortion." Id. at 895. This standard significantly departs from the traditional
requirement that a facial challenge must establish that "no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). In applying
Casey instead of Salerno, the Sixth Circuit joined a number of other courts in holding that the
Casey standard displaces Salerno, at least in the abortion context. See Women's Med. Prof'l
Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases). The Sixth Circuit,
however, was the first court to extend the Casey standard to the post-viability context. See id. at
196. The wisdom of applying Casey rather than Salerno in either context is worthy of consideration.
Moreover, Voinovich presents a number of unique grounds on which to test the Casey
Court's recognition that the state's compelling interest in potential life needs to be accorded
greater weight than previous decisions have given it. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 ("Not all governmental intrusion is necessarily unwarranted; and that brings us to the other basic flaw in the
trimester framework: even in Roe's terms, in practice it undervalues the State's interest in the
potential life within the woman."). The mental health issue, see Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 209, the
"cruelty to the fetus" justification, see Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1072, and the D & X procedure, see Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 193, were all issues of first impression in Voinovich.
43See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1081.
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versible impairment of a major bodily function,' 44 House Bill 135
gave the following nonexhaustive examples: "(1) pre-eclampsia; (2)
inevitable abortion; (3) prematurely ruptured membrane; (4) diabetes;
(5) multiple sclerosis."4 5 The court interpreted this language to limit
the exception only to physical health risks.4 6 Judge Rice relied on
Doe v. Bolton47 to hold "that a state may not constitutionally limit the
provision of abortions only to those situations in which a pregnant
woman's physical health is threatened, because this impermissibly
limits the physician's discretion to determine what measures are necessary to preserve her health. ' ' 8 The court cited delivery of a severely deformed baby49 and of one conceived by rape or incest50 as
examples of when an abortion might be justified on grounds of the
mother's mental health.

The court had an equally dim view of the rest of the postviability provisions.

While the court upheld the statute's defini-

tion of "viable,"' because it relied on the physician's subjective
determination of viability, 52 the statutorily prescribed method for
applying this definition was struck down.53 The court determined
that the method impermissibly included an objective component of
reasonability, 54 and would therefore "chill the physician's determi-

nation of non-viability, and create an undue burden." 55 The court
advanced a similar argument with respect to the objective medical
emergency exception, especially in conjunction with the exception's lack of a scienter requirement and the court's refusal to imply one.56 The second physician concurrence and attendance re44
45

Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.16(J) (Anderson 1998).
I
4See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1078.
4 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
41 Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1080-81. Judge Rice's statement begs the question, however,
of how a doctor's ability to preserve a woman's health is impinged if the state has defined the
word49"health" in that context to mean only physical well-being.
See id. at 1078-80.
"oSee id. at 1080.
51House Bill 135 defined "viable" as:

The stage of development of a human fetus at which in the determination of a physician, based on particular facts of a woman's pregnancy that are known to the physician and in light of medical technology and information reasonably available to the
physician, there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing life outside of
the womb with or without temporary artificial life-sustaining support.
OHIO52REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.16(L) (Anderson 1998).
See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1077 n.32.
53
See id.
5 See iULat 1077.
5 Id. at 1077 n.32.
56 See id. at 1081 ("[F]irst, it lacked a mens rea, or scienter requirement, and therefore was
vague; second, it did not allow physicians to rely solely on their own best clinical judgment in
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quirements, as well as the choice-of-method requirement, were
likewise found to make post-viability abortions more difficult to
obtain, impermissibly trade off between the mother and fetus's
health and "chill" doctors from performing the abortions. 57 Finally, the court criticized, 58 but refused to reach the merits of the

viability presumption.5 The court thus found a substantial
likeli6
hood of the Plaintiffs' success, justifying the injunction. 0
2. The D & X Ban and the Viability Testing Requirement
The D & X ban was invalidated on vagueness and "undue burden"
grounds. 61 Although acknowledging that particular abortion procedures could be prohibited if safe alternatives are available, 62 the Court
found Ohio's broad definition of D & X to include another, more established procedure, Dilation & Evacuation ("D & E").63 Physicians
would not, then, have fair warning of what the Bill prohibited. 64 The
court also reasoned that this result would leave some women without
access to the safest possible procedure in certain situations, such that
the D & X ban constituted
an "undue burden on the right to seek a
65
pre-viability abortion."
The court discussed but did not resolve the question of cruelty to
the fetus.6 6 This debate centered on expert testimony regarding
whether a fetus is capable of experiencing pain. 67 The medical evidence strongly
suggested that fetuses at viable ages, and FS
perhaps even
68
earlier, may in fact suffer physical pain when aborted. The court
assumed for argument's sake that Ohio had a legitimate interest in
determining that a medical emergency existed, and so would chill physicians from exercising
their best medical judgment in deciding whether such an emergency exists.").
57See id at 1087-89.
58See id. at 1090 n.41.
59See id. at 1090.
6 See id. at 1094.
61 See id. at 1072.
62 See id. at 1067.
63See iL at 1063-64. D & E entails dismemberment of the fetus in the womb with suction
curettes and forceps, and removing the pieces individually. See id. at 1064. The procedure is
typically used after the thirteenth week of pregnancy, when the fetus becomes too large to remove by suction curettage. See id.
64See id. at 1067.
65Id. at 1072.
66See id at 1073-74. The court broached the subject for the sake of posterity, but given its
determination that the D & X ban constituted an undue burden on the pre-viability abortion
right, the issue was technically moot. See id. at 1072.
67 See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1072-75.
68See Brief Amici Curiae of the Am. Ass'n of Pro Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists, the
Christian Legal Society and the Christian Med. and Dental Society, In Support of DefendantsAppellants at 13-14, Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997)
(Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159) [hereinafter "AAPLOG Brief"].
69See generally id.
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mitigating this risk, 70 but refused to speculate as to when a fetus possesses the degree of consciousness necessary to experience pain as we
know it.71 As with many facets of the abortion controversy, the court
considered this a matter of individual conscience. 72 As to the procedure itself, it was significant
that alternative procedures may be
73
equally painful to the fetus.
The third major aspect of House Bill 135 required a physician to
perform a series of medical tests to determine a fetus's viability before aborting it.74 Finding this to be unconstitutionally vague, the
court held for the Plaintiffs on this challenge as well.7 5
After issuing the preliminary injunction, the district court consolidated the preliminary hearings with the trial on the merits.7 6 The
court issued a permanent injunction on January 12, 1996, without
77
further opinion, and the Defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
C. The Sixth CircuitDecision
Circuit Judges Kennedy and Brown upheld Judge Rice's decision
although "through somewhat different reasoning." 78 The court agreed
that House Bill 135 defined the D & X procedure vaguely enough that
D & E might also be covered. 79 The appellate court, however, was
more explicit in its recognition that Casey's undue burden standard
applies only before viability.80 Thus, a D & X ban may have a greater
chance of surviving after viability. The Ohio ban, however, was not
found to be severable into pre- and post-viability components. 81
70

See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1074.
71See id at 1073.
7 See id.
at 1074.
73See id. at 1073-74.
74
The Bill provided:
Except as provided in [the medical emergency exception], no physician shall perform. . . an abortion upon a pregnant woman after the beginning of her twentysecond week of pregnancy unless, prior to the performance [of] ...the abortion, the
physician determines, in good faith and in exercise of reasonable medical judgement,
that the unborn human is not viable, and the physician makes that determination after
performing a medical examination of the pregnant woman and after performing or
causing the performing of gestational age, weight, lung maturity, or other tests of the
unborn human that a reasonable physician making a determination as to whether an
unborn human is or is not viable would perform or cause to be performed.
l at 1090 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.18(A)(1) (Anderson 1998)).
75
See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1090-9 1.
76See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 192 (6th Cir. 1997). This
was done by stipulation of the parties. See iU.
7'n
5See i& at 192.
1 d. at 198.
79See id.at 198.
"0See id at 201.
81See idt at 202.
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In analyzing the various post-viability provisions of House Bill
135, the court narrowed its focus to the health and medical emergency
exceptions. 82 The court agreed with Judge Rice that "the combination
of the objective and subjective standards without a scienter requirement renders these exceptions unconstitutionally vague, because physicians can not know the standard under which their conduct will ultimately be judged., 83 Since any post-viability regulation must contain sufficient medical exceptions, this vagueness was held to be fatal
to all of the post-viability provisions.84
Given this holding, the question of whether the health exception
included purely mental health was moot. 85 The court discussed it,
however, "since it was extensively briefed and argued. Further, if the
statute is amended
to meet the deficiencies found here, this issue will
86
still remain.
The court interpreted the exception to cover only physical health.
Indeed, the Appellants themselves advanced this position at oral argument 87 and in their briefs. 88 The Bill's legislative history, moreover, specifically indicated that the exception was meant to have the
same meaning as the substantially identical, physical-health-only provision upheld by Casey in the context of a pre-viability waiting period. 89 The court's reading of Supreme Court precedent compelled it
to agree with Judge Rice that a post-viability restriction on abortion
must contain a mental health exception. 90 The court, however, decided that the Constitution only requires an exception for "severe[,]
irreversible risks of emotional harm,"' 9 1 as opposed to "severe-buttemporary" effects.92
Judge Boggs dissented from each of the court's holdings.9 3 He
began by identifying two principles in the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence: (1) that states can regulate abortion procedures as long
as they do not create an undue burden on the abortion right, and (2)
that some post-viability abortions can be banned if they are not neces82See id. at 203.
" Id. at 205. The Appellants did not challenge the district court's holding that Ohio law
would not support the importation of a scienter requirement. See id. at 206.
84See id. at 203.
u See id. at 206.
'6Id. at 206.
'7See id. at 206-07.
88See Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 16-18, Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159) [hereinafter "Reply Brief"].
'9See Voinovich, 130 F.3d. at 209 n.20. The significance of Casey's approval of this provision is discussed infra in Part III(C).
90
See id at 209.
91 Id. at 209.
92Id. at 209 n.20.
93See id. at 211 (Boggs, J.,
dissenting).
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sary to preserve the life or health of the mother. 4 He then took issue
with the Appellees' position, "asserted[] with commendable candor"
at oral argument, 95 that these two principles, properly construed,
"pose no barrier to any woman seeking an abortion at any time for
any purpose. ' 96 If this were the Court's intent, he reasoned, surely
they would have made that position plain, "rather than setting up a
maze that legislatures can in fact never successfully negotiate (despite
the Court's apparent invitation to them to try)., 97 "To adopt [this]
position," Judge Boggs argued, "would be to assume that the Supreme Court is deeply dishonest rather than simply deeply divided. 98
As to the D & X ban, Judge Boggs protested the majority's "offhand dismissal" of the Bill's affirmative defense allowing doctors to
prove that there was no safer alternative available. 99 Given the weight
of evidence indicating that the D & X procedure was rarely, if ever
medically indicated, 1 ° Judge Boggs characterized the majority's concerns as focusing on "an extreme example." 10 1 He also dismissed the
"chill" argument relied on by both courts, noting that "all criminal
laws chill conduct that is at the margins of legality."102 Hence, Judge
Boggs would not have reached the severability issue, since he found
the D &
X ban constitutional in both the pre- and post-viability con03
texts.1
The main area of disagreement between the majority and the dissent on the post-viability regulations was the need for a scienter requirement. 1°4 Judge Boggs did not reach the question of whether Casey required a mental health exception. Rather, to the extent that a
mental health exception was necessary, he read the Bill's language to
be "sufficiently broad to encompass such a requirement." 10 5 Applying a principle of judicial restraint cautioning that "courts must refrain
from passing on the constitutionality [of a statute] unless obliged to
do so,"' 10 6 Judge Boggs would have simply acknowledged that Ohio's
examples of a "serious risk of a substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function' 10 7 were non-exhaustive, and not ex94See id. at 212
95Id.

961am
97
1d.
98Id.

99See id at213.
100See id at 214 (citing the American Medical Association).
'01 Id. at 214.
102Id.
103See id. at 215.

'04 See id

05
' Id. at 216.
106Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
107OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.16(J) (Anderson 1998).
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elusive of the "'severe risks of mental and emotional harm[]' language... [that] the majority would apparently approve." 108 In other
words, if mental health is included in the definition of "health," there
is nothing in the Bill to contradict that definition.' °9
To Judge Boggs, the biggest losers in Voinovich and several

other decisions were the state legislatures nationwide who can not
find clear constitutional guidance in the convoluted reasoning of
many courts. Drawing an analogy to "the classic recurring football
drama of Charlie Brown and Lucy,"1' 0 Judge Boggs lamented that
"clear guidance to state legislatures as to where they permissibly
can impose abortion regulations appears not to be the real motivation of plaintiffs nor the likely result of cases such as ours."' 1
D. The Supreme Court Denies Certiorari
12
The Supreme Court denied Ohio's appeal for a writ of certiorari.1
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist.1 3 This opinion narrowed the issues further
by addressing only the post-viability restriction,1 4 and then only two
aspects of the decision below: the scienter requirement and the mental
health exception.11 5 The Justices saw both
"conclusions... [as] un' 16
warranted extension of our precedents."
The dissenting Justices went farther than Judge Boggs, arguing
that the Supreme Court had never required a mental health exception.
The Justices referred back to Doe, in which a health exception was
held not to be vague because it had already been construed in state
court to have the broad meaning that the Voinovich majority saw as

'08Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 217 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
109Judge Boggs did not address how he weighed the Appellant's concession that the exception should be read to only include mental health. Judicial restraint would seem to counsel a
decision based strictly on the record before the court. Judge Boggs did indicate, however, that it
would be "prudent to wait for an authoritative statutory construction from an Ohio court." I. at
217.
"o Id. at 218-19. Judge Boggs explains:
Lucy repeatedly assures Charlie Brown that he can kick the football, if only this time
he gets it right. Charlie Brown keeps trying, but Lucy never fails to pull the ball
away at the last moment. Here, our court's judgment is that Ohio's legislators, like
poor Charlie Brown, have fallen flat on their backs. I doubt that the lawyers and litigants will ever stop this game. Perhaps the Supreme Court will do so.
Id. at 219. The Supreme Court would not do so, however, in this case.
..
Id. at 218.
12
1 See Voinovich v. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998).
113See id. at 1348 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114See id.
115Because the mental health argument was apparently dicta in Judge Rice and the Sixth
Circuit's opinions, it seems appropriate to question whether this issue was properly before the
Court.
116 Voinovich, 118 S. Ct. at 1348 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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required." 7 The "conclusion that the statutory phrase at issue in Doe
was not vague because it included emotional and psychological considerations," however, "in no way supports the proposition that, after
viability, a mental health exception is required as a matter of federal
constitutional law. Doe simply did not address that question."'1 18 Nor
did the Justices find their precedents to warrant "a constitutional scienter requirement to119be imposed under the guise of the void-for-

vagueness doctrine."

Like Judge Boggs, Justice Thomas lamented for the "vast majority of the 38 States that have enacted postviability abortion restrictions [and] have not specified whether such abortions must be
permitted on mental health grounds.' 120 The Court's failure to
grant certiorari, the Justices feared,
"may cast unnecessary doubt
21
statutes.
those
of
validity"
the
on
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS: DoEs SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REQUiRE
A MENTAL HEALTH EXCEPTION TO POST-VIABILITY ABORTION

BANS?
The Supreme Court has never directly held that a post-viability
health exception must include mental health to be constitutional.' 22
There have been dicta on both sides of the question, but the Court has
only ruled on the vagueness of health exceptions, not their minimum
constitutional threshold. Justice Thomas was correct, then, to question the assumption that the constitutional necessity of a mental health
exception is a settled question. Prior to Casey, however, such an assumption seemed safe. But given the Court's renewed respect for the
compelling state interest in potential life, 123 especially once that life
becomes viable, this now is truly a matter for the full Court to resolve.

"

7

See id. at 1349 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 183 (1973)).
Id.
I1

119
Id.
120
id.
121Id.
122 See Bradley S. Clanton, The Nullification Machine (visited Oct. 8, 1998) <http:ll
www.leaderu.edu/ftissues/ft9808/Clanton.html>.
12 See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875 (1992) ("Not all governmental intrusion is necessarily unwarranted; and that brings us to the other basic flaw in the
trimester framework. even in Roe's terms, in practice it undervalues the State's interest in the
potential life within the woman.").
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A. The Source of the Debate: Vuitch and Doe
The Court first addressed the meaning of the word "health" in the
abortion context before it decided Roe v. Wade.
1. United States v. Vuitch 124
In Vuitch, the ,Court heard a vagueness challenge to a District of
Columbia statute that criminalized abortions "unless the same were
done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health
...
.,125 A doctor had been indicted under the statute, but the D.C.
District Court dismissed the indictments without trial on the grounds
that "[t]he word 'health' is not defined and in fact remains so vague in
its interpretation and the [sic] practice under the act that there is no
indication whether it includes varying degrees of mental as well as
physical health." 126 The court reasoned that, without firm guidelines,
doctors would be subject to each individual jury's interpretation of
the statute, and could never know the legal bounds of permissible
conduct.127 Moreover, the wording of the health exception led to accused abortionists being unconstitutionally
presumed guilty until they
128
could prove themselves innocent.
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the statute. The Court
focused most of its attention on the burden of proof issue, articulating
a general approach to deciding the constitutionality of criminal statutes. 129 As to the health exception, the Court limited its discussion to
"the contention that the word 'health' is so imprecise and has so uncertain a meaning that it fails to inform a defendant of the charge
against him and therefore the statute offends the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution. We hold that it does not."1 30 The Court examined the legislative history of the provision and found no attempt to
define the term.13 1 The Court then looked to a recent District of Columbia case, in which both the district and appellate court interpreted

124402 U.S.
'2'Id. at 68.

62 (1971).

'26
Id. at 68 n.3.
127See id.

'28See id.

129See id. at 68-71.

The Vuitch case is perhaps best known for the sentence, "[b]ut of

course statutes should be construed whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality."
Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 70. Indeed, a recent search of the Shepard's database reveals that to this
day, most citations of Vuitch are for this proposition, and not the definition of the word "health."
Search of LEXIS, Shepard's Service (Feb. 9, 1999).
130Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 71 (citation omitted).
131See id. at 71.
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132
"health" to include a broad range of factors,
and followed this con133
courts.
local
by
statute
local
a
struction of
Strictly speaking, the Court's holding did not address whether the
definition of "health" chosen by the District of Columbia was constitutionally required. Writing for the five-Justice majority, Justice
Black did, however, observe that "[c]ertainly this construction accords with the general usage and modem understanding of the word
'health,' which includes psychological as well as physical wellbeing."' 134 The Court also indicated its approval by quoting Webster's
Dictionary's"properly" broad definition of health. 135 Foreshadowing
its reliance on professional medical judgment in future abortion cases,
the Court concluded by noting that "whether a particular operation is
necessary for a patient's physical or mental health is a judgment that
physicians are obviously called upon to make routinely whenever
surgery is considered. 1 36 These statements are clearly dicta, given
the Court's preceding ruling on vagueness, but they nonetheless indicate a predisposition of several Justices towards the broader concept
of health.
Other opinions in the decision added different insights to the
meaning of "health." Justice White's brief concurrence stressed that a
provision allowing abortions for health reasons, "whatever that phrase
means,",13713inno way legalized abortion in other contexts. 3 8 Justice
Douglas's partial dissent argued that the statute, as written, violated
procedural due process because it did not give physicians appropriate
39
discretion to determine whether a mother's health was threatened.1
He clearly accepted the possibility that mental health could properly
be included in a health exception, 14 but unlike the majority, did not
accept that District of Columbia precedent was sufficient to outline
the parameters of the word "health." Justice Douglas found the exception to be worded broadly enough so as to allow jurors to vote according to their individual convictions on abortion, to the physician's
peril. 141 The hypotheticals he posed in his opinion echo the same
questions being asked today, and demonstrate that, at least for Justice

132See i&' at 71-72 (citing Doe v. General Hosp. of the D.C., 313 F. Supp. 1170 (D.C.

1970), aff'd, 434 F.2d 423 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
133See id. at 72.
'3Id.
at72.
35
1 Id. (citation omitted).
3 Id.
13
38

Id at 73 (White, J.,
concurring).

1 See id at 73-74.
139
See id at 74 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140See id' ("Those trained in conventional obstetrics may have one answer, those with
deeper psychiatric insight may have another.")
141See id at 77-78.
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Douglas, the repuirement
of a mental health exception remained an
14
open question.
Given the "tortured divisions" within the Court on this case, it is
difficult to argue that Vuitch has much precedential value for any
proposition.143 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, White and
Blackmun joined the Court's opinion. 144 Justice Harlan, oddly
enough, also filed a dissenting opinion as to jurisdiction, which Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun (who also joined the majority)
joined.1 45
46

2. Doe v. Bolton1

The Court next addressed the meaning of health in its companion
case to Roe v. Wade. Doe involved a Georgia abortion statute that
criminalized abortions in all but three situations: rape, severe fetal
defect, or when "continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the
life of the pregnant woman or would seriously and permanently injure
her health."' 47 The district court severed all three conditions from the
statute on the grounds that "the reasons for an abortion may not be
proscribed. 1 48 This left an exception without the word "health,"
which permitted abortions whenever "based upon . . . [the physician's] best clinical judgment that an abortion is necessary.' 149 Other
than removing these150 and other related restrictions, the court allowed
the statute to stand.
142Justice

Douglas's hypotheticals included:

A doctor may well remove an appendix far in advance of rupture in order to
prevent a risk that may never materialize. May he act in a similar way under this
abortion statute?
May he perform abortions on unmarried women who want to avoid the "stigma"
of having an illegitimate child? Is bearing a "stigma" a "health" factor? Only in isolated cases? Or is it such whenever the woman is unmarried?
Is any unwanted pregnancy a "health" factor because it is a source of anxiety?
Is an abortion "necessary" in the statutory sense if the doctor thought that an additional child in a family would unduly tax the mother's physical well-being by reason of the additional work which would be forced upon her?
Would a doctor be violating the law if he performed an abortion because the
added expense of another child in the family would drain its resources, leaving an
anxious mother with an insufficient budget to buy nutritious food?
Is the fate of an unwanted child or the plight of the family into which it is born
relevant to the factor of the mother's "health"?
Id. at76.
143Memorandum from Johnathan Entin, Professor of Constitutional Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University, to author (Feb. 19, 1999) (on file with author).
'44
See Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 63.
145See id. at 81 (Harlan, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction).
146410 U.S. 179 (1973).
147Id. at 202 (app. A)
148Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (three-judge panel).
'49Doe, 410

U.S. at 202 (app. A).

'-o
Doe, 319 F. Supp. at 1056.
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The district court did mention health factors, but it did so in discussing the state's interest. It held that states "may legitimately require that the decision to terminate [a] pregnancy be one reached only
upon consideration of more factors than the desires of the woman and
her ability to find a willing physician., 151 In this vein, the court holistically approved of Georgia's decision to see "to it that the decisions [sic]- personal and medical-is not one undertaken lightly and
without careful consideration of all relevant factors, whether they be
emotional, economic, psychological, familial or physical."15 2 The
court framed its discussion of health in terms of state interest in fetal
life, not a woman's ability to defeat that interest by asserting that her
pregnancy would be injurious to her mental health. The court did not
distinguish between abortions before and after viability.
The Supreme Court summarized the net effect of the district
court's ruling as freeing the physician from artificial constraints on
his medical judgement. 153 The Court recalled its holding in Vuitch
that health was not vague because it had been authoritatively construed and the actual health determination was left to the physician.1 54
That conclusion, the Doe Court asserted, "is equally applicable
here. 1 55 The Court then characterized the decision below as holding
that the doctor's "judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial and the woman's
age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All of these factors
may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the discretion he needs to make his best medical judgment. 1 56 Under this construction, the Georgia statute was not void for vagueness.
Again, the Court's ultimate holding on this issue was simply that
the health exception was not vague. Doe, then, can logically be read
as not imposing a constitutional mandate that all post-viability health
exceptions include mental health. Unlike Vuitch, however, this stat-

1
2
'1

Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1055-56.

'5 See Doe, 410 U.S. at 191 (observing that after the district court's decision, the abortion
provider "is not now restricted to the three situations originally specified. Instead, he may range
farther afield wherever his medical judgment, properly and professionally exercised, so dictates
and directs him").
"4See itt at 191-92.
15 Id at 192.
' Id. Justice Stewart also demonstrated in his Vuitch partial dissent that his primary focus
was the right of the doctor to perform abortions as she sees fit. His brief opinion stated that
"simply by extending the reasoning of the [Vuitch] Court's opinion to its logical conclusion...
the legal practice of medicine in the District of Columbia includes the performing of abortions.
For the practice of medicine consists of doing those things which, in the judgment of a physician, are necessary to preserve a patient's life or health.' United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at
96-97 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting in part).
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ute had not been construed by Georgia courts, 157 and neither the district court nor the Supreme Court made any reference to state law or
doctrine. Moreover, the Georgia statute no longer contained the word
"health" and the district court approved of the state's interest in considering all facets of health, not its requirement to do so. As such,
the Vuitch interpretation of health hardly appears applicable. Doe's
citation to Vuitch, then, seems at first glance to either be an attempt,
conscious or otherwise, to gloss over the issue, a mistake, or a sub
silentio elevation of the District of Columbia's definition of the word
"health" to a higher level.
It is also possible, however, that the Court read into the Georgia
statute the "health" language of the Model Penal Code ("MPC"). The
Georgia statute at issue was relatively new and untested, and was
based on the American Law Institute's treatment of abortion in its
MPC. 158 The Doe Court noted this fact at the outset of its opinion,
along with the observation that the MPC had inspired nearly a quarter
of the abortion laws then in force. 159 The opinion referred the reader
to Appendices A and B, 160 where both the Georgia and Model Codes
were reproduced, and the Court referred to both statutes throughout
its opinion. The MPC permits abortions if "[a physician] believes
there is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother ... ,,161
This language was substantially synonymous with that in Vuitch.
Reading the two statutes together would have made good judicial
sense. First, the MPC was the Court's only outside source of insight
into the Georgia statute's meaning, and was the next best thing to an
authoritative construction. In that sense, the Vuitch vagueness analysis was, in fact, applicable. Second, given the proliferation of the
MPC nationwide, interpreting its language would provide substantial
and helpful guidance to a number of states. Third, it allowed the
Court to construe the law so as to preserve its constitutionality as
mandated by Vuitch.
There is further reason to doubt that Doe imported the Vuitch definition of "health" into the Constitution. In his concurring opinion,
Chief Justice Burger agreed that the statutes in Roe and Doe impermissibly restricted some abortions that were necessary for the
57

1 The statutes at issue had recently been adopted to replace a 90-year-old Georgia abortion

law, and had not been tested on constitutional grounds in Georgia courts. See Doe, 410 U.S. at
182-83.
'58
See id. at 182 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)).
159See id. at 182-83.
160See id. at 182.
161Id. at 205 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE, § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962))
(emphasis added).
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mother's health in the Vuitch sense of the term, which he called "its
broadest medical context."1 62 Moreover, he rejected the dissent's
"sweeping" reading of the opinion, explaining that "the vast majority
of physicians observe the standards of their profession, and act only
on the basis of carefully deliberated medical judgments relating to life
and health. Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortions on demand."' 163 The Chief Justice did not
see Roe and Doe as revolutionizing abortion law as much as merely
approving practices that the states had already put into place.
In his concurrence, Justice Douglas again explored a number of
ways in which unwanted pregnancy may impede a woman's general
well-being. While agreeing with the district court that a state may not
limit the reasons for which an abortion is sought, he also noted that
another "difficulty is that this statute... apparently does not give full
sweep to the 'psychological as well as physical well-being' of women
patients which saved the concept 'health' from being void for vagueness in [Vuitch]."'1'6 Justice Douglas appears, however, to have believed that pregnancies "which may impair 'health' in the broad
Vuitch sense of the term"' 65 counsel having "an early abortion,"' 66 as
opposed to one after viability. Indeed, Justice Douglas again empha' 67
sized the state's interest in "the life of the fetus after quickening."'
For him, Vuitch would have no applicability to the Voinovich controversy.
3. Vuitch and Doe Alone Do Not Require a Mental Health
Exception After Viability
These two cases alone do not create an obvious outcome for the
Voinovich mental health question. As precedent, they stand only for
the proposition that the two exceptions involved were not void for
vagueness. Clearly, both decisions approved of taking a broad range
of considerations into account when assessing the impact of an unwanted pregnancy on a woman's health. Both cases were also primadly motivated by the desire to protect abortion-providing doctors
from unnecessary legal hassles, by giving them as free and welldefined a range of choices as possible. But the goal of protecting
physician discretion also seems to have been at least as important, if
62

1 Id. at 207-08 (Burger, C.L, concurring).

'6 Id at 208.
1'"Id. at 215 (Douglas, J., concurring).
'6' Id at 215-16. Following Justice Douglas's lead, this Comment usually refers to the expansive definition of health at issue in Doe and Vuitch as the "broad Vuitch sense" of the term.
16 Id at 216 (emphasis added).
67 Id at 215.
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not more so, than the breadth of the health definition. If the statutes
had been authoritatively construed to provide for a physical-healthonly exception, they would have been no more vague than the broad
Vuitch interpretation of health.
Moreover, neither of these cases address the more specific
question of Voinovich, which is whether the presence of a viable
fetus changes the appropriate scope of the health concept. It is instructive to recall that both of these decisions were made in the
pre-Roe legal environment, before the average person had ever
thought of abortion in terms of "trimesters" or "pre- and postviability." Before Roe, abortion was generally illegal at all stages
of pregnancy; abortions for health reasons were as much an "exception" to the norm before viability as after. 168 Roe and Doe
made the woman's motive a non-issue until the point of viability,
at which time the Court determined that the state interest in potential life trumps the woman's liberty interest in terminating her
pregnancy. 169 Indeed, given Justice Douglas's unanswered observation in Doe that the health question was relevant only before vi170
ability, and the Court's instruction to read Roe and Doe together,
there is nothing in these cases to support extending the broad
Vuitch sense of health to post-viability cases. Vuitch and Doe,
then, can provide insight regarding the Court's view of health, but
they can not answer how that concept compares to the compelling
state interest in fetal life.
B. Application of the Vuitch/Doe Definition of Health
Subsequent courts have interpreted Vuitch and Doe's treatment of
health in one of the following four ways: (1) they were simply vagueness decisions with no bearing on the meaning of health; (2) they do
not require one specific definition of health, but rather that the health
determination be made by the individual physician; (3) they require
health to be defined in the broad Vuitch sense; or (4) they require such
a definition only when health is left undefined. This body of law has
always been ambiguous. If there was a plurality rule, however, it
would have been option (3)-at least before the Casey decision.

168See id. at 221-23 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (arguing that the Doe Plaintiff should be denied a pre-viability abortion under the Vuitch standard because she had not asserted any threat to
her life or health).
169See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
'7o
See id. at 165.

1999]

WOMEN'S MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL CORP. v. VOINOVICH

819

1. Vuitch and Doe as Simple Vagueness Decisions
This approach, advocated by the Appellants 171 and dissenting Justices172 in Voinovich, views Vuitch and Doe as irrelevant to the constitutional definition of health. The approving language in those decisions may have indicated the Court's preference, but is nonetheless
nonbinding.
This view draws support from the Colauttiv. Franklin173 decision.
There, the Court struck as void for vagueness a statute restricting
abortion when a fetus is "viable" or "may be viable." 174 The statute
prescribed that a viability determination was "to be based on the attending physician's 'experience, judgment or professional competence,' a subjective point of reference." 175 The undefined distinction
between "viable" and "may be viable" created a "double ambiguity,''176 and failed to provide reasonably certain guidelines for doctors. 177 The Court found this dilemma "readily distinguishable from
the requirement that an abortion must be 'necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health,' upheld against a vagueness challenge in [Vuitch], and the requirement that a physician determine, on
the basis of his 'best clinical judgment,' that an abortion is 'necessary,' upheld against a vagueness attack in [Doe].' 7 8 In contrast, the
Colautti statute "condition[ed] potential criminal liability on confusing and ambiguous criteria.''17 It did not, however, violate any
minimum threshold established by Vuitch and Doe.
2. Vuitch/Doe as Establishinga Physician'sAutonomy to Define
Health
The importance that the Court places on the physician's role in the
abortion decision is readily apparent. Some decisions could be read
to support the argument that Vuitch, and especially Doe, import this
consideration into the health exception, requiring states to allow doc171See Brief for Defendants-Appellant at 42, Women's Med. Prof'1 Corp. v. Voinovich,
130
F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997) (Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159) [hereinafter "Appellants' Brief']; Brief for
States of Nebraska, Alabama,. California, Illinois, Mississippi, and South Carolina and the
Commonwealth of Virginia as Amici Curiaein Support of Appellants at 24-25, Women's Med.
Prof'I Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997) (Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159) [hereinafter
"Nebraska Brief"].
1n See Voinovich v. Women's Med. Prof'1 Corp., 118 S.Ct. 1347, 1349 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
74
' Id. at 393.
75
76 Id.at 391.
1 la at 393.

"n See id.at 394.
178
l& at 393-94 (citations omitted).
19
' 7 Id. at 394.
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tors full autonomy to determine when an abortion is needed for health
reasons, even after viability. As will be seen, however, no decision
has explicitly found this subjectivity requirement to be a constitutional mandate. Instead these cases appear to support the purevagueness interpretation discussed above.
The first of these decisions is Colautti. In a recitation of its precedents, the Court described Doe as "underscor[ing] the importance of
affording the physician adequate discretion in the exercise of his
medical judgment." 180 In the Colautti Court's words, the Doe "Court
found it critical that that judgment 'may be exercised in the light of
all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the
woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient.', 1 8 ' At first
glance, this language suggests that physicians are entitled to unbridled
discretion in their diagnoses, but this interpretation is not sound.
First, the Court acknowledged in the same paragraph that the Doe
decision was rendered "in a vagueness-attack context. 1 82 Second,
the entire discussion took place in the context of invalidating the viability-determination provision discussed above and a section requiring use of the procedure most likely to preserve the fetus's life. Both
the ascertainment of viability and the method used in a particular procedure are decisions based on "the judgment of the attending physi'
Neither of
cian on the particular facts of the case before him."183
these grounds directly involves the scope of the doctor's ability to
define a woman's health, whether pre- or post-viability.
Justices Marshall and Blackmun were also advocates of this approach. In their dissent to Beal v. Franklin's'84 holding that nontherapeutic18 5 abortions were not medically necessary procedures entitled to state funding under Title XM, 186 the Justices took issue with
the Court's interference with the physician's decision: "The Court's
original abortion decisions dovetail precisely with the congressional
purpose under Medicaid to avoid interference with the decision of the
woman and her physician." 187 Citing what they saw as the govern-

"0 Id. at 387.
ld. at 387-88 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
I8'
,3 Id. at 387.
1 1Id.at 388.
'84432 U.S. 438 (1978).
'85 In abortion terminology, a "therapeutic" abortion is one performed for medical reasons.
"Nontherapeutic" abortions, by contrast, are elective, and "eugenic" abortions are those performed because of fetal defect. See Curt S.Rush, Note, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion,
and Roe v. Wade: How Viable is Roe's Viability Standard?, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 113, 115
(1983).
186See Beal, 432 U.S. at 447.
187Id. at 450 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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188
ment's restrictive application of Vuitch and Doe at oral argument,
the Justices appeared to argue that even these broad considerations
can be too restrictive of the woman's rights. They noted that those
cases "were more broadly directed to the 'well-being' of the
woman,"' 189 as opposed to the narrower term "health." The Justices
also argued that the focus on health was getting away from the actual
nature of the privacy right involved: "[w]hile the right to privacy does
implicate health considerations, the constitutional right recognized
and protected by the Court's abortion decisions is the right of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
9 0 Whether a doc... the decision whether to bear or beget a child."'
tor wished to rely on the Vuitch factors or other considerations entirely, these two Justices would have prohibited the government from
questioning that decision.
At least three lower federal courts have emphasized physician discretion in the context of Vuitch and Doe. In Fargo Women's Health
Organizationv. Schaefer,19 1 the Eighth Circuit rejected a vagueness
attack against the exception to a mandatory waiting period in North
Dakota. 192 The statute "allow[ed] the physician to rely on his or her
'best clinical judgment' in determining whether a condition constitutes a medical emergency ... [and] eliminate[d] the waiting period
requirement if there [was] 'grave peril of immediate and irreversible
loss of major bodily function."" 93 Citing Doe, Vuitch and relying
heavily on the Third Circuit's similar reasoning in Casey,194 the court
explained that "it is the exercise of clinical judgment that saves the
statute from vagueness."' 95 The court found the differences in wording between the North Dakota and Casey statutes irrelevant, deciding
that "the difference in the adjectives is not material to our analysis.' 196 It did not delve further into Doe and Vuitch to explain its
holding.
Casey may not, however, support the Eight Circuit's interpretation. In reviewing language nearly identical to that in Schaefer, the
Third Circuit distinguished the holdings of Doe and Vuitch from the
provision struck down in Colautti. Regarding the latter case, the
court "stated that it was unclear whether the Act incorporated a sub-

' See id at 451.
189Id.

190Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
19'18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
192
See U at 534.
193 /IL (citations omitted).
194947 F.2d 682, 702 (3d Cir. 1991).
19'Schaefer, 18 F.3d at 534.
'

id.
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jective or objective standard. In addition, the definition of 'may be
viable' was elusive and did not provide sufficient notice." 197 In contrast, the Casey statute imposed a purely subjective standard, "thus
making the case more similar to Vuitch and Doe than to Colautti.We
fail to see how any physician practicing in good faith could fear conviction under the Act. 198 The court relied further on Doe to hold
that the medical emergency exception also required a subjective determination, saving it from vagueness.199
Contrary to the mandatory-subjectivity interpretation of this language, Casey's reasoning may actually provide more support to the
pure-vagueness interpretation of Doe and Vuitch discussed above than
to the requirement of physician discretion. The only two distinctions
that Casey drew between Vuitch/Doe and Colautti were (1) the uncertainty over whether the provision was objective or subjective, and
(2) the ambiguous definition of "may be viable." In Casey, the viability question did not apply and the standard was clearly subjective.
The court therefore found sufficient "notice," the prime objective of
any vagueness question. The court gave no indication that an objective standard with adequately defined parameters would not pass
vagueness scrutiny. Indeed, the vagueness question in abortion jurisprudence seems to arise most often when legislatures use complicated
(and hence vague) terminology to circumscribe a doctor's decisionmaking, 200 rather than telling the physician "you decide"-a command that anyone can understand. To the extent that the Eighth Circuit saw subjectivity as always being required, then, its decision
seems incorrect.
The District of Utah has also found physician discretion to defeat a
20 1
vagueness claim in reviewing a statute in Jane L. v. Bangerter,
which provided that doctors were to use their "best medical judgement" when determining the necessity for an abortion. The court,
citing Vuitch, Doe and Casey, noted that "the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of statutes which permit the physician's best
medical judgment to determine the necessity of abortion." 20 2 Hence,

'97

Casey, 947 F.2d at 702.

198Id.

'99See id. at 702.
2m See American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283,

298 (3d Cir. 1984) ("It is noteworthy that no Supreme Court case has upheld a criminal statute
prohibiting abortion of a viable fetus. Each such statute considered either did not contain such a
criminal provision effective at viability or was invalidated because there were fatal omissions in
the statutory language or scheme.").
2 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992).
2 2

= Id. at 879.
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neither that provision nor the medical emergency exception was
vague. °3
Again, this language could be read to require subjectivity. But this
court's reasoning appears to be indistinct from the Third Circuit's. In
summarizing its holding, the Utah court explained that the statute
"provides the fair warning to physicians required by the Due Process
Clause, sets clear guidelines for enforcement officials, and is therefore not void for vagueness. ' '2°4 By upholding the subjective statute,
the court did not by implication suggest that objective standards
would necessarily fail. That question was simply not presented.
3. The Broad Vuitch Sense of Health as a Constitutional
Requirement
This position was forcefully asserted by the Voinovich Appellees, 20 5 and ultimately adopted by the Sixth
Circuit.20 6 Other courts
20 7
interpretation.
this
have set precedents for
In American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh,20 8 the Third Circuit summarily determined that Doe required
health to be defined in the broad Vuitch sense even after viability, and
then observed in dicta2 0 9 that "the Pennsylvania legislature was hostile
to this definition. '21° A separate provision of the statute at issue there
contained the statement, "'[the potential psychological or emotional
impact on the mother of the unborn child's survival shall not be
deemed a medical risk to the mother.' Had the legislature imposed
this qualification on the language 'maternal ...health' ... we would
have no hesitation in declaring that provision unconstitutional." 2u
Other Supreme Court decisions, however, do arguably give support to the Third Circuit's Thornburgh dicta. Indeed, the Roe Court
itself observed the psychological implications of an unwanted preg-

2203See

id at 879-80.

4Id. at 880.

2
See Brief Amici Curiae of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action
League Foundation, et al., at 25 n.10, Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187
(6th Cir. 1997) (Nos. 96-3157, 96-3159) [hereinafter "NARAL Brief']; Brief of PlaintiffsAppellees at 40, Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997) (Nos.
96-3157, 96-3159) [hereinafter "Appellees' Brief'].
206See Women's Med. Prof'1 Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 208 (6th Cir. 1997).
" In addition to American decisions, courts in the United Kingdom have interpreted the
analogous exception to their abortion law to also include mental health. See CIBA FOUNDATION

SYMPOSiuM, ABORTION: MEDICAL PROGRESS & SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 112 (1985).

20"737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984).
209See Paul B. Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight From Reason in the Supreme
210Court, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 24 (1993) (noting that this language was dicta).
Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 299.
211Id. (citations omitted).
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nancy. 212 Again in Harris v. McRae,213 the Court noted that Roe
"emphasized the fact that the woman's decision carries with it significant personal health implications-both physical and psychological.
In fact, [Roe] held that even after fetal viability a State may not prohibit abortions 'necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother."' 2 14 The juxtaposition of the statements on psychological
health and on health exceptions to post-viability bans strongly suggests the Court's willingness at that time to adopt the broad Vuitch
sense of health in the post-viability context. As discussion was a
prelude to Harris'sultimate holding that states were not constitutionally required to fund abortion services,2 15 however, it is nonbinding
dicta.
Perhaps the Court's strongest language in support of the broad
Vuitch definition came in Beal v. Franklin. 6 Although the ultimate
issue in Beal was virtually identical to that in Harris,217 Justice Powell's majority opinion noted in a preliminary footnote:
In Doe ... this Court indicated that [whether] an abortion
is necessary is a professional judgment that... may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to
the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate
to health. This allows the attending physician the room he
needs to make his best medical judgment.2 18
The issue was not presented in Beal because the state assured the
Court at oral argument that the "definition of medical necessity is
broad enough to encompass the factors specified in [Doe v.] Bolton." 219 Nonetheless, Justice Powell provided no caveat that the Doe
statement was made in the context of a vagueness attack. Whether
this footnote was an oversight or a subtle indication of the Court's

2 12

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). The Court stated:

Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by
child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
Id.
213448 U.S. 297 (1980).
214 Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
215See

id. at 326-27.
U.S. 438 (1978).
217See id. at 440.
218Id. at 442 n.3 (internal quotations omitted).
219 id.
216432
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willingness to extend Vuitch, it provided more than adequate ground
for the Third Circuit's blanket statement in Thornburgh.
Several federal district courts have explicitly followed this interpretation. The Southern District of Indiana interpreted Doe in this
220
manner in A Woman's Choice-EastSide Health Clinic v. Newman.
The court traced the legislative history of Indiana's health exception
to its post-viability abortion ban, and determined that the legislature
had intended it to apply only to physical health. The court found this
construction unacceptable, as it would not be "as broad[] as the Constitution requires.... [I]t would not permit the broader 'construction'
proposed by defendants here and would have221a meaning different
from the meaning of 'health' in Doe v. Bolton."
222
A three-judge panel of the District of Utah in Doe v. Rampton
categorically struck down a provision "because it prohibit[ed] abortions performed to preserve the mental health of the mother."223 In
addition, at least three federal courts have relied on the broad
VuitchlDoe meaning of health to strike post-viability exceptions limited to threats to the woman's life.224 These unambiguous holdings
leave no room for a narrower definition of health.
At least two non-m-ajority opinions are in accord. In a partial dissent to the Rampton decision, Judge Alton Anderson argued that some
of the provisions struck could be severed and upheld.225 Specifically,
he would have upheld a "physical health" exception to a post-viability
abortion ban by striking the word "physical." He based his decision
on Vuitch, where he read "the Court [as] interpret[ing] 'health' to
mean both a patient's mental and physical state; that is, psychological
as well as physical well-being." 226 Then in Doe, he asserted, "this
interpretation was broadened to include other factors," namely "emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age." 22 7 Moreover,
Judge Anderson argued that health after viability "should be defined
in the same manner as it is for the period before viability. '228 Addi220 904

F. Supp. 1434, 1466 (S.D. Ind. 1995).

2'

Id. at 1471.

22

366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).

23 Id. at 192-93.
27ASee United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1973); Rodos v. Michaelson,
396 F. Supp. 768, 775 (D.R.L 1975); Montalvo v. Colon, 377 F. Supp. 1332, 1343 (D.P.R.
1974).
m See Rampton, 366 F. Supp. at 199 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 200-01.
f Id. at 201.
2 Id. Judge Anderson apparently based this conclusion on the fact that the definition in
Vuitch "apparently applied to the entire gestation period." Id. at 201 n.2. Because Vuitch was
decided before Roe made viability the point where the state's interest in fetal life becomes compelling, however, there would have been no reason for the Vuitch statute to make any distinction
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tionally, a dissenting opinion in a non-abortion Seventh Circuit case
recognized
Vuitch as "permitting abortions for mental health rea2 29
sons.
The Indiana Supreme Court also applied the broad Vuitch sense of
health beyond viability. In answering certified questions from the
federal district court in Newman, the court found "that a doctor's regard for all relevant factors pertaining to a woman's health is implicit
in the term 'clinical judgment.' 23 The court based its decision on
Doe, which it characterized as "holding that 'health' included both
physical and mental health.",231 Although acknowledging that Doe
was a vagueness case, the court made no mention of the fact that the
Vuitch/Doe definition originated from the District of Columbia and
Georgia statutes. Instead, it followed the lead of the federal courts
listed above, and incorporated the definition as established constitutional law.
4. Vuitch/Doe as a Gap-FillerWhen Health is Left Undefined
This approach is a decidedly minority one, having only been advanced by the Connecticut Supreme Court, and even that decision
was outside the abortion context. In State v. Payne,2 32 that court examined a child endangerment statute that left the word "health" undefined. Citing Vuitch, the court held that "health, when undefined by
statute, includes mental health. 233 The Payne court did continue,
however, to opine that this was an appropriate, modem interpretation
and it cited decisions from five other states, arising in various contexts, also interpreting health to include mental health. 234 Like the
courts applying the first, vagueness-only approach, the Connecticut
Supreme Court may prefer that health be defined broadly as a general
proposition, but it will look first to how the legislature defines its own
terms.

between various gestational ages. Thus, Vuitch has no bearing on what "health" should mean
before and after viability in the post-Roe world.
229 See Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 1975) (Sprecher,
J., dissenting).
230 A Woman's Choice East-Side Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Newman, 671 N.E.2d 104, 109
(Ind. 1996).
23 Id. at 110 n.10.
232695 A.2d 525 (Conn. 1997).
233
Id. at 531.
234See id. at 530 (collecting cases). As the dissent pointed out, however, Payne itself was
inconsistent with a prior Connecticut decision that found that the word "health" in a nearly
identical statute did not include mental health. See id. at 534 (Berdon, J., dissenting) (citing
State v. Schriver, 542 A.2d 686 (Conn. 1988)).
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C. Health and the Compelling State InterestRevisited: How
Casey May Alter the Interpretationof Vuitch and Doe
The Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey2 35 strongly suggests that it would not constitutionally require a mental health exception to post-viability abortion
bans. This is true for two basic reasons: (1) the principles it most
heavily relies on reinforce, rather than restrain, a state's justification
for rejecting a broad exception after viability; and (2) Casey's specific
treatment of a physical-health-only exception demonstrates that the
Court will not require "health" to be defined broadly in every context.
1.

Casey's Impact on the Basic Principles of Abortion

Jurisprudence
The logic of the Casey decision, 3 6 if applied faithfully, should

change abortion jurisprudence in several profound ways. First,
and most importantly in terms of this Comment's subject matter,
the Court reaffirmed the legitimacy and compelling nature of the

states' interests in protecting fetal life and the mother's health.
From the beginning, the Court has recognized that abortion is
constitutionally different from other surgical procedures because
only abortion involves the destruction of a potential human
being. 37 Roe recognized that states have an important interest in
potential life from conception,238 and this interest grows stronger
as time passes and the fetus develops. 239 But as Casey recognized,

the judicial zeal since Roe to protect the abortion right has
sometimes led courts to devalue this compelling interest: "[tihose

decisions went too far because the right recognized by Roe is a
2"5505 U.S. 833 (1992).
236

Although the joint opinion of Justices Souter, O'Connor and Kennedy only commanded
a plurality of the Court, it has nonetheless been recognized as the controlling opinion. See
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1310 n.2 (1994) (Souter, J., in chambers) (instructing that the joint opinion in Casey is controlling); Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls
Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1456 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); A Woman's Choice-East Side
Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434, 1444 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (same). The joint
opinion represents the least common denominator of all concurring Justices, and most of its
assertions were not questioned in the concurring opinions of Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
2 37
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 ("Abortion is a unique act."); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
325 (1980) ("Abortion is inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other
procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life."); Planned Parenthood of Wis.
v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 477 (7th Cir. 1998) (Manion, J., dissenting) ("In a gall bladder operation.., the doctor removes and destroys a diseased organ.... In a partial birth abortion, the
doctor destroys a 'potential' life.").
23 8
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 154 (1973).
239
See id. at 162-63.
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right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion ....

Not all governmental intrusion is of necessity unwarranted."2 40
For the Casey Court, the reason for this devaluation was Roe's

own "trimester" framework, because "even in Roe's terms, in
practice it undervalues the State's interest in the potential life

within the woman." 24 In rejecting the trimester framework, Casey
attempted a jurisprudential house cleaning.
It specifically
overruled parts of its previous decisions that had gone too far, 242
and cast doubt on other holdings that may also devalue the interest
of the state. 24 3
Second, Casey reaffirmed that fetal viability is the threshold at
which judicial scrutiny favors the state. 244 Roe chose viability as the
point at which the state interest becomes compelling, overriding the
woman's liberty interest, 245 because at viability the fetus has a reason246
able chance to experience meaningful life outside the womb. Indeed, in rejecting Roe's trimester framework, it has been said that
Casey replaced it with "bimesters"-the periods before and after viability. 247 After viability, abortion regulations are presumed to be
valid.248 Abortions may be banned outright at this point, except only
when "continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to [the
woman's] health." 249
Third, Casey harmonized its precedents with these two meta-rules
by reclassifying the abortion right and the scrutiny it invokes. Abortion after Casey is a "liberty interest," no longer a "fundamental
right" entitled to "strict scrutiny" for every impinging law.2 0 Be240Casey, 505

U.S. at 875 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Id. at 875.
242See id. at 881-82 (overruling parts of City of Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive
24

Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetriciansand Gynecologists,476 U.S. 747 (1986)).
243 See Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463,473 (7th Cir. 1998) (Manion, J.,
dissenting); Nebraska Brief, supranote 171, at 19, 28.
2" See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
245 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
246See id. Put another way, viability is the point at which the right to end one's pregnancy is
no longer co-extensive with the right to kill one's fetus. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION:
THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 224-25 (1992); Nancy K. Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma:
Live Birthsfrom Late Abortions, 72 GEO. L.J. 1451 (1984) [hereinafter Rhoden, Neonatal Dilemma]. This dividing line has been reaffirmed repeatedly. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 428 (1983); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 389 (1979).
247See Linton, supra note 209, at 35.
248 See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1060 (S.D. Ohio
1995).
249Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
250 See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 875 n.25 (D. Utah 1992) ("In Casey the
Court revised the woman's right to abortion from a virtually unassailable fundamental right
subject to strict scrutiny review to a liberty interest subject to undue burden analysis.").
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cause "[n]ot all governmental intrusion is of necessity unwarranted," 1 regulations of the abortion right are invalid only if they
impose an "undue burden" on the liberty interest'2 2 Importantly,
however, this "undue burden" analysis applies only before viability.253 Casey does nothing to alter the presumption of constitutionality of prohibiting abortion after viability, and indeed bolsters the validity of post-viability regulations.
Fourth, Casey reined in somewhat the Court's previously sweeping language regarding the right of doctors to prescribe abortions as
they see fit. In rejecting the argument that an informed consent provision impinged on the doctor's medical autonomy, the Court noted that
the doctor's rights in this context are "derivative of the woman's position. The doctor-patient relation does not underlie or override the
two more general rights under which the abortion right is justified: the
right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy. 'z 4
The doctor is an agent of the woman, and is legally empowered to
perform abortion-related services only to the extent that the woman is
able to delegate that authority. The physician brings no additional
liberty interests into consideration. This principle directly conflicts
with the interpretation of Vuitch and Doe that doctors are free to define the scope of the health exception.
2. Casey's Treatment of Physicaland Mental Health
In addition to announcing these principles, Casey explicitly upheld
a physical-health-only exception. In the broader context of the Casey
opinion, this action casts serious doubt on the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Voinovich.
Casey upheld the medical emergency exception to two Pennsylvania pre-viability regulations: a twenty-four hour waiting period and an
informed consent requirement 7 5 Because both of these provisions
would fail without a valid health emergency exception, its validity
was "central" to the decision. Pennsylvania's exception permitted
abortions for women who were at risk of "death or for which a delay
will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a
major bodily function."5 7 The district court in Casey had found this
2" Casey, 505 U.S. at 875.
252 See id at 874. The Court attempted to harmonize past decisions even further by reconciling two previous, inconsistent articulations of the "undue burden" standard into "a standard of
general3 application to which we intend to adhere." Id. at 876.
21 See id at 877.
SId. at 884.
5
2 See id.
at 879-80.
2
16Id.at 879.
Z Id.
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language too limiting, noting several physical conditions that would
not be covered by this language 5 8 In reversing, the Third Circuit
found the language broad enough to cover those risk factors.2 9 Because this interpretation was not plainly erroneous, the Supreme
Court accepted it.260 While the Court did not make this clear, the
Third Circuit was explicit in recognizing that its expanded reading of
the exception still only covered physical health.2 61 The Court was
quick to conclude that this language posed no undue burden on the
pre-viability abortion right.262
The Court also held that the regulations to which this exception
applied were not an undue burden. The record in the case indicated
that the twenty-four hour waiting period would subject women to a
number of inconveniences: 263 at least two visits would be required;
women who lived a great distance from a clinic would spend a good
deal more time travelling; they would be subjected to more "hostility
and harassment" 264 from anti-abortion demonstrators; and the net effect of all of these factors would be "particularly burdensome" on
women with the fewest financial means and greatest desire to keep
their abortions secret. Undoubtedly, all of these considerations would
increase "the cost and risk of delay of abortions, 2 65 and subject the
woman to significant amounts of additional stress and anguish. The
Court found this "troubling in some respects, 2 66 but the waiting period was nevertheless justified to serve the state's interest in fetal life,
and did not pose an undue burden.
The Court's approval of the informed consent provision also
helped shed light on its view of "health." Although the decision overruled the holdings of two previous cases, the state interest in fetal life
justified a provision requiring a woman's signed statement that she
had been made aware of literature on alternatives to abortion-materials that advocated birth over abortion and described the impact on
the fetus. 267 The Court began by observing that "[i]t can not be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health. 2 68 PreviSee id. at 880 (including pre-eclampsia, inevitable abortion and ruptured membrane).
25 See id
260 See id.
261See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d at 701 (3d Cir. 1991).
262
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
m See id. at 885-86.
' Id. at 886. It is interesting to note here that the efforts of the most fervent anti-abortion
demonstrators, aimed at dissuading the performance of abortions, actually become a factor for
persuading the Court to strengthen the abortion right.
2 id.
2M id.
267
See id. at 881.
m Id. at 882. This sentence could be read to confirm what has been labeled here as Approach (3)-that Vuitch and Doe incorporate into the Constitution a broad definition of the word
289
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ously, courts had found that additional information would increase
distress to the woman, but Casey took an opposing view because "[i]n
attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences
of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing
the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later,
with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was
not fully informed."269 The Pennsylvania statute also exempted doctors from the informed consent requirement, "if... furnishing the
information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the
physical or mental health of the patient. 270 With the state interests in
both fetal life and maternal health behind it, the inconvenience posed
by the informed consent requirement did not pose an undue burden.
3. Applying Casey to Voinovich and the Post-Viability Mental
Health Exception
The Sixth Circuit's Voinovich majority attempted to distinguish
Casey. In a single-paragraph discussion, the panel made two points:
first, Casey dealt only with a pre-viability delay, not an outright ban
in the post-viability context. 271 Second, it noted that although the undue burden standard is inapplicable after viability, restrictions are still
subject to the life or health exception. As if it had satisfactorily distinguished Casey, the court announced that "[t]herefore, we reject
defendant's reliance on Casey" to uphold Ohio's physical-health exception. 272 The court then cited Vuitch and Doe as enshrining a broad
interpretation of health,273 and Coluatti as requiring that physicians be
given discretion to use any of the Vuitch/Doe factors in defining
health.274 With this, the panel majority decided that "the Court will
hold, despite its decision in Casey, that a woman has the right to obtain a post-viability abortion if carrying a fetus to term would cause a
severe non-temporary mental and emotional harm.' 275
The Casey decision, however, shapes the abortion jurisprudence in
far more profound ways than the panel majority's superficial treatment of the case acknowledges. Most important is Casey's reaf"health" in all contexts. Compared to this assertion, however, the Court's action in upholding a
physical-health-only medical emergency exception belies this categorical interpretation. It is
also significant that all of the Casey regulations applied only before viability.
29id.
270 l

at 883-84 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990)).

271See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 208 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Im-

portantly, a woman would still be free to choose to have an abortion.").
273
274

See ii
See ULat 208-09.

275 Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
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firmation that after viability, "the independent existence of the second
life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that
now overrides the rights of the woman. ' 76 Voinovich's interpretation
that the Casey restrictions were permissible because they still ultimately allowed abortions to occur, is ill-conceived. The only reason
that the ultimate availability of the abortion decision mattered at all to
Casey's rationale was that the decision was made solely in the previability context. That fact has precisely nothing to do with the validity of a post-viability regulation like that in Voinovich. Every post77
viability regulation should enjoy a presumption of constitutionality
and be upheld unless the statute is proven to endanger a woman's life
or health enough to outweigh the state's superior interest.
Voinovich's abandonment of Casey before reaching its definition
of health in the post-viability context ignores the breadth of the Casey
decision's treatment of this subject. The Court's approval of Pennsylvania's physical-health-only exception, without even mentioning
Vuitch or Doe, strongly suggests that an exception need not be
worded in the broad Vuitch sense to be constitutional. The Court did
not posit any hypothetical emotional impact that must necessarily be
included in the exception.2 7 8 Indeed, the Court listed several very
realistic and quite emotionally draining drawbacks of the waiting period, including severe harassment by protestors, prolonging the experience by far more than twenty-four hours, and substantial travel burdens. It also acknowledged that being required to learn about alternatives to abortion and the procedure's effect on the woman's fetus
would undoubtedly be distressing. To be sure, these facts command
sympathy. Nevertheless, the Court decided that they were not severe
enough to overcome the state's interest in protecting fetal life through
this limited means, by encouraging the woman to fully consider-and
perhaps reconsider-her choice to undergo abortion. This was true
even though in the pre-viability context, the woman's liberty interest
ultimately outweighs those of the state. How much less can these
emotional factors outweigh the state interest in fetal life after viability, when it is constitutionally the overriding concern?
Casey's observation on the importance of psychological health
does not change this result for several reasons. First, this was merely

276

Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
2n See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1060 (S.D. Ohio
1995).

278See

Reply Brief, supra note 88, at 17-18 ("Casey was not troubled by the hypothetical

prospect that some unidentified 'psychological' condition might not fall within the medical
emergency exception there and just upheld the statute.").
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a statement, and probably dicta, 279 whereas the Court's approval of
the physical-health-only exception was an actual holding. Second, it
was made in the context of the informed consent provision, which by
its own language specifically instructed doctors to consider psychological health factors. Casey's statement simply approved of this decision. Third, nowhere in the discussion did the Court cite Vuitch or
Doe's broad health definitions. This detracts from the idea that Casey's statement molded the broad language in those decisions into
requirements. And most importantly, Casey's discussion of mental
health took place entirely in the pre-viability context. It is reasonable
to assume that the Court would be more willing to accept a broad
conception of health when the woman's liberty interest outweighs the
state interest, as opposed to vice versa.
Finally, Casey also belies the propriety of Voinovich's reliance on
Colautti to require a broad range of medical discretion in defining
health. The rights of the woman, not the doctor, govern the abortion
decision. To allow a doctor unfettered discretion to choose what factors on which to base a diagnosis, as opposed to the discretion to
make the diagnosis based on a pre-defined set of factors, seems
anomalous. After Casey, a Pennsylvania doctor can not waive the
waiting period requirement before a pre-viability abortion for any
mental health reason, no matter how severe. It makes very little
sense, then, to argue that the same doctor should be able to justify an
abortion on the same grounds after viability, when the liberty interest
of his patient, and of the doctor as well, has been subsumed by the
state interest.
The only difference between Ohio's health exception and Pennsylvania's was the pre- and post-viability distinction. Indeed, the
phrasing of Ohio's exception was identical to that of Pennsylvania's,
and the Ohio legislature itself instructed that it be given the same construction as in Casey.280 The Voinovich court, then, should have followed Casey's example and upheld the statute.
D. InstitutionalDeference to Congress:How the PartialBirth
Abortion DebateAffects the Voinovich Question
Congress's adoption of a ban on the D & X procedure without a
mental health exception may provide the Court with further reason to
reject the Voinovich result. The Court noted its willingness to take
279 See id. at 16 (calling the sentence a "fleeting statement [that] will not bear the weight
Appellees give it"). The definitiveness of the statement, however, counsels that it be taken
seriously.
5 0
m See id. (citing House Bill 135 § 4, 121st Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995)).
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into account Congress's approach to tough, constitutional linedrawing in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee.28 1 There, the Court examined the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) decision regarding its licensees' policies on viewpoint advertisements.282 The Court acknowledged its
lack of expertise in the broadcast media industry, and the existence of
a regulatory system that had been carefully constructed by Congress
by Congress and the FCC over several decades.283 It noted that
[t]he judgment of the Legislative Branch cannot be ignored or
undervalued simply because [the plaintiff invokes] the First
Amendment. That is not to say we "defer" to the judgment of
Congress ... on a constitutional question .... The point is,
rather, that when we face a complex problem with many hard
questions and few easy answers we do well to pay careful attention to how the other branches of Government have addressed the same problem.2 84
To be sure, if any area of law presents "a complex problem with
many hard questions and few easy answers," it is abortion--especially after viability. Should the Court face the question of postviability mental health exceptions, it would do well to "pay careful
attention" to Congress's actions on partial-birth abortions.
Congress has been overwhelming and unrelenting in its opposition
to a mental health exception. Twice the Congress has passed a bill
prohibiting the partial birth abortion procedure. Twice President
Clinton has vetoed the bill on the grounds that it did not have a sufficiently broad mental health exception.2 85 The Hoyer Amendment to
the Partial Abortion Ban Act, advocated by the President, would have
defined its health exception broadly enough to include mental health
and psychological trauma.286 Twice the Congress was nearly successful in overturning the veto.
Moreover, a pair of proposals by Democratic Senators Daschle
and Feinstein in 1997 to ban post-viability abortions nationwide failed
to gain enough support, largely because most Senators believed that
neither bill would accomplish anything; both contained mental health
28 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
2 See id. at 97.
281See id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
m See Nancy E. Roman, et al., Senators Battle over Bill on Partial-BirthAbortion; Clinton
Backs Daschle amid EmotionalPleas, WASH. TIMES, May 15, 1997, at A12.
2 See Rep. Steny Hoyer, quoted in NRLC, Watch What He's Doing, Not What He Says
(visited Oct. 8, 1998) <http://135.145.12.245/abortionlpbalclintonlie.html> [hereinafter NRLC,
Watch What He's Doing] ("Does it include.., mental health? Yes, it does.... It is because it
poses a psychological trauma to the woman to carry to term .... ).
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exceptions that many saw as "loopholes. 287 Curiously, President
Clinton had thrown his support behind the narrower of the two exceptions-Senator Daschle's-which was limited to a "risk [of]
grievous injury to [a woman's] physical health." 288 Both Daschle and
Clinton explained that this wording was sufficient to cover "severe
2 89
mental stress, [which] can sometimes manifest itself physically.
Congress, has never collectively interpreted the Constitution to require a broad mental health exception, despite numerous opportunities
and the political pressure of the White House. This record would be
pertinent to the Court's decision, should it ever be asked to resolve
the issue, for the same reasons that the Court gave in Columbia
Broadcasting System. Indeed, that case involved the heightenedscrutiny-invoking First Amendment, whereas this issue deals only
with a liberty interest that is subject to several governmental compelling interests. Some Justices have sought a means to return the contentious abortion issue back to the political realm and out of the
courts. 29
While a complete abandonment of this nowconstitutionalized issue is impracticable, taking explicit heed of the
public's representatives on the matter of mental health exceptions
would be a welcome step towards bolstering the popular legitimacy of
the Court's abortion jurisprudence.
In sum, there is little reason to believe that the Supreme Court's
precedents require a post-viability abortion ban to include an excep287Katherine Q. Seelye, Senators Reject Democrats' Bills to Limit Abortion, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 16, 1997, at Al.
288 David J. Garrow, A LOOK AT... The New Politicsof Abortion; When "Compromise"
Means CavingIn, WASH. PoST, June 1, 1997, at C03.
289Michael McCurry, The White House Washington, D.C. Regular Briefing, FED. NEWS
SERVIcE, May 14, 1997, availablein NEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Indeed, in a letter
to the president and ten past presidents of the Southern Baptist Convention in 1996, before he
took a public stance against the partial birth abortion ban, President Clinton gave a much different opinion on the mental health exception:
I also understand that many who support this bill believe that any health exception is,
as you suggest, a 'loophole... to include any reason the mother so desires,' such as
youth, emotional stress, financial hardship or inconvenience. That is not the kind of
exception I support. I support an exception... making crystal clear that the procedure may be used only in cases where a woman risks death or serious damage to her
health, and in no other case.
NRLC, Watch What He's Doing, supra note 286.
290 Justice Scalia, for instance, in his dissenting opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), noted:
The outcome of today's case will doubtless be heralded as a triumph of judicial
statesmanship. It is not that, unless it is statesmanlike needlessly to prolong this
Court's self-awarded sovereignty over a field where it has little proper business since
the answers to most of the cruel questions posed are political and not juridical-a
sovereignty which therefore quite properly, but to the great damage of the Court,
makes it the object of the sort of organized public pressure that political institutions
in a democracy ought to receive.
Id. at 532 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
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tion to protect only a woman's mental health, as opposed to physical
well-being. The Court has suggested on numerous occasions that it
may require such an interpretation, and certainly several courts have
anticipated such a ruling, including Voinovich. Casey, however,
seems to be a clear sign that the power of States to protect viable fetal
life is not so circumscribed that a woman or doctor can evade it simply by asserting an unreviewable diagnosis of mental or emotional
distress. Of course, there is no indication that states are disallowed
from providing such an exception; post-viability abortions are not
illegal unless a state chooses to prohibit them. There are obviously a
significant number of citizens and legislators that favor such exceptions, and an equally great number that oppose them. In Part IV, this
Comment will explore the policy justifications behind each position.
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS: SHOULD THERE BE A MENTAL HEALTH
EXCEPTION TO POST-VIABILITY ABORTION BANS, AND IF

So, WHAT

SHOULD IT LOOK LIKE?
In considering post-viability mental health exceptions to abortions, legislators may not be solely concerned with the constitutional
permissibility of such laws, but also with their practical, societal and
moral advisability. Those aspects of the debate are summarized below.
The first question to ask when considering a mental health exception is, what are the mental health reasons given for abortions? If a
broad conception of health is so passionately defended as necessary
by so many, then there must be data supporting their claims. Opponents of post-viability mental health exceptions, on the other hand,
offer two general refutations: that there are no detriments to mental
health severe enough to justify a post-viability abortion, and that the
abortion experience itself not only fails to cure the perceived threats,
but can actually exacerbate them. The former argument begs the
question of how to decide what is "severe enough." To answer this
question, one must examine the counterweight to the woman's interest in seeking an abortion: the nature of the state's interest in the fetus. While the legal basis for this interest has been explored above,
this Part briefly addresses elements of the state interest that have only
recently received much attention: the psychological impact to the
woman of an abortion (mentioned in Casey), the impact of the abortion decision on the woman's partner and family (implicated by the
broad Vuitch definition of health) and the "cruelty to the fetus" argument (introduced in Voinovich). Finally, this Part asks how a mental
health exception might affect those interests in practice, and how the
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exception might be worded, based on the language in current proposals and statutes.
A. Mental Health Reasonsfor an Abortion
Two principles should guide exploration of the interrelationship of
a woman's mental health and abortion: first, the experience of pregnancy itself and the unique effects it has on a woman's emotional
state is something that can never be fully understood by those who
will never share the experience. 291 Regardless of the importance one
gives to the life of the fetus the woman carries, one should be careful
not to devalue the woman's suffering. 292 While this awareness should
inform an evaluation of abortion laws, it must not dissuade the legal
community from honestly evaluating the justifications behind those
laws, or prevent lawmakers and citizens from rethinking their conclusions when necessary. Nor is it necessarily true that any attempt to
question or disagree with broad, mental-health-based justifications for
abortion is an attack on women or a slandering of their motives, as the
ad hominem rhetoric of some of the more staunch abortion-rights
supporters has suggested.2 93
Second, the data on why women undergo abortions is incomplete.294 This is especially true with late-term abortions, 295 perhaps
because statistics indicate that the overwhelming majority of abortions are performed in the first trimester.2 9 6 Consequently, much of
the data used in this section will include women seeking pre-viability
Moreover, a significant amount of misinformation
abortions.
abounds in the literature. Still, the data is the best available, and
when taken together it offer a number of insights.
1. The Reasons Women Give for Aborting
Most women in the U.S. give an average of four reasons for
aborting. The most common reasons given by women in the United
States for choosing to abort are "not being ready for how a baby
would change their lives (76%), not being able to afford a baby (68%)
and wanting to avoid single parenthood or having problems with
291This

includes the author.

at 136.
supra note 288, at C03; Groups
Try to Devalue Mind Ills as Reason for Allowing Procedure, supra note 12, (characterizing
opposition to a mental health exception as an attack on the sanity of women who choose abortion, and calling Justice Thomas's dissent in Voinovich "chilling").
294 See MARY BOYLE, RE-THINKING ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGY, GENDER, POWER AND THE
LAW 1 (1997).
295
29 6 See Gans Epner, supra note 24, at 725.
See id.; Seelye, supra note 287, at Al.
2 A similar warning was given by TRIBE, supra note 246,
293See NARAL Brief, supra note 205, at 3 n.1; Garrow,

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 49:799

partner relationships (51%).,,297 These decisions "emerge within the
complex web of a woman's relationships and life choices, 29 8 including age (one of four is a teenager), unstable relationships (six of ten
are unmarried), commitments to others (almost half are already mothers), and financial situation (a third earn less than $11,000 per
year).299 Many of these explanations span the spectrum of what might
conventionally be considered "mental health": emotional unavailability to raise a child,3°° recent death of a husband, °1 short period of
time since the birth of a previous child. 2 All of these factors are
causes of psychological stress, and indeed, several abortions have
been justified purely on stress grounds. 30 3 Perhaps the most questionable example was the decision of Dr. Haskell, the D & X provider in
Voinovich, to justify an abortion on the basis of the woman's agoraphobia,3 4 or fear of open places.
An Alan Guttmacher Institute ("AGr') study on the reasons for
late-term abortions is in accord. Those results found that "youth,
poverty, isolation, fear, ignorance, rape and incest were frequently
factors.,, 30 5 Alan Guttmacher was the president of Planned Parenthood Federation of America for over a decade,30 6 and the AGI is
widely considered to be the most reliable source for abortion statistics. 30 7 An abortion may be also be desired after viability when the
woman mistakes the age of the fetus, or endures relational problems

2-" See Nancy F. Russo, Ph.D., Psychological Aspects of Unwanted Pregnancy and Its
Resolution, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAw 607 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert
eds., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Russo, PsychologicalAspects].
298Jeanne P. Lemkau, Emotional Sequelae of Abortion: Implicationsfor Clinical Practice,
12 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 461,464 (1988).
299See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at 607. These factors are often interrelated as well; for example, unmarried mothers are more likely to face financial setbacks from
the birth of a child. See id. at 608; see also NRLC, ForWhat Reasons Are Late-Term Abortions
Usually Performed? (visited Oct. 8, 1998) <http://www.nrlc.organization/abortion/
pbafact9.html> [hereinafter NRLC, For What Reasons?] (citing poverty and youth as predominant motivations for late-term abortions).
300 See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at 609.
301See ic
3
2See id.
at 610.
303 See 142 CONG. REC. E1743, E1747 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Douglas
Johnson, NRLC Federal Legislative Director).
304 See NRLC, For What Reasons?,supra note 299 (citing testimony of Dr. Haskell in Voinovich).
305 Marie McCullough, The Facts Behind "PartialBirth" Debate (visited Oct. 8, 1998)
<http:llwww.phillynews.com/inquirer/98/Sep/16/frontpage/PBA16.htm>.
306 See The Alan Guttmacher Inst., History (visited Mar. 14, 1999) <http://www.agiusa.org/agiabout/history.htm>.
307 See Nancy F. Russo, Adolescent Abortion: The Epidemiological Context, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL & LEGAL ISsuEs 41 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986) [hereinafter Russo, Adolescent Abortion]; Nancy F. Russo, et a., U.S. Abortion in Context: Selected
Characteristicsand Motivations of Women Seeking Abortions, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 185 (1992)
[hereinafter Russo, U.S. Abortion in Context].

1999]

WOMEN'S MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL CORP. v. VOINOVICH

839

in the midst of pregnancy. 30 8 Under the broad Vuitch/Doe sense of
the "health" exception, which considers "physical, emotional, psychological, familial [health], as well as the woman's age,''309 each of
these reasons could be construed as affecting a woman's health.
The psychological impact of unwanted pregnancy and birth is especially pronounced in teenage mothers. 310 Adolescent mothers generally attain less education and economic success, experience more
marital problems and have more children overall than their peers. 31'
Teenagers are also more prone to deny their pregnancy and delay
seeking neo-natal care. As a result, pregnant teens represent a disproportionate amount of those women seeking late-term abortions.3' 2
Perhaps the most commonly understood psychological motivations
for a late-term abortion include pregnancies resulting from rape or
incest, 313 or in the case of severe fetal defects. 314 Bearing a child under any of these circumstances would undeniably cause a mother
great stress and anguish.3 15
Whatever the motivation for an abortion, bearing an unwanted
child can be a significant source of psychological distress for the
mother in a number of ways,316 even if the child is subsequently
adopted.3 17 One study found that as many as a third of such mothers
30 See Gans Epner, supranote 24, at 725.
309
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973).
3 10

See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at 599.

31 See Jeanne Marecek, Consequences of Adolescent Childbearing and Abortion, in
ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL & LEGAL ISSUES 98-102 (Gary B. Melton ed.,

1986); Gary B. Melton et al., Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, in ADOLESCENT
ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL & LEGAL ISSUES 17 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986).
312 See Nancy Adler, Psychological Issues in Abortion for Adolescents, in ADOLESCENT
ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL & LEGAL ISSUES 75 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986) [hereinafter Adler, Adolescent Abortion].
313See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1080 (S.D. Ohio
1995) ("In this Court's view, it is inconceivable that the act of being forced to bear her father's
child, could have failed to have a severe, negative, and lasting impact on this girl's emotional
and psychological health."); A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F.
Supp. 1434, 1473-74 (S.D. Ind. 1995) ("The affidavit.., concerning women who are victims of
rape and incest shows that a significant proportion of victims suffer significant psychological
difficulties, including post-traumatic stress syndrome or a major depressive episode. Such difficulties can be made worse by pregnancy resulting from the rape or incest."); NARAL Brief,
supranote 205, at 31-32 (emphasizing the district court's concerns).
314See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1080; CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM, supra note 207,
at 113.
315See Appellees' Brief, supra note 205, at 40; NARAL Brief, supra note 205, at 26. All
states confronting this issue have recognized a tort of wrongful birth and have allowed parents
to recover damages for the psychological distress that bearing a deformed child causes them.
See Rush, supra note 185, at 139.
316See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at 594 ("The few available studies of
women denied abortion suggest unwanted childbearing can have a profound and long-lasting
psychological impact.").
317See id at 593, 621. There are, however, very few studies on the mental health effects of
adoption on the birth mother, especially in contrast to abortion. See id at 621. What studies
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resented their child at one- and two-year follow-up interviews, and
suggested a possible correlation with suicide attempts." 8 From the
beginning, Courts have acknowledged these concerns,3 19 and several
studies have explored their frequency and severity.320
2. PhysicalHealth Is Rarely a Factor
One striking fact that emerges from the literature is that a
woman's physical health is not a factor in the vast majority of abortions. Many, especially the most vocal supporters of abortion rights,
have asserted or at least assumed that late-term abortions are performed only where a woman's health is severely threatened. 32 1 Many
media outlets have accepted and conveyed this misinformation, 322 but
a number of more recent studies have dispelled this myth.32 3 Indeed,
one Washington Post columnist, who had previously made this assertion, retracted it after doing more research.32 4 One Planned Parentthere are, however, have led some to suggest that it may have a more pronounced effect on the
mother, because it is felt for a longer amount of time, see id. at 620, especially if the mother
feels coerced into giving up her child. See id. at 622. This extrapolation seems arguable, however; whether the fetus dies in the womb or is born and lives with adoptive parents, the birth
mother still has the same amount of time to reconcile herself with her decision. Moreover, the
adoption procedure used is also relevant as studies suggest that an open adoption procedure may
help to alleviate the birth mother's possible depression. See id. at 623.
18See id. at 594.
319
See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 214-15 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); Voinovich,
911 F. Supp. at 1091-92.
320
See Lemkau, supranote 298, at 463.
321See, e.g., Ann M. Massie, So-Called "PartialBirth Abortion" Bans: Bad Medicine?
Maybe. Bad Law? Definitely!, 59 U. PITT.L. REv. 301, 322 (1998) ("To the extent that the D &
X procedure is employed for post-viability abortions, the cases described [detailing narratives of
women receiving abortions for dire health emergencies] would undoubtedly be typical, as the
Roe/Casey framework permits a state to prohibit all post-viability abortions except those necessary to preserve the woman's life or health."); Michelle Roman, Topical Summary: The PartialBirth Abortion Act and the Undue Burden It Places on Women's Right to an Abortion: The
Controversy over D & E, Dilation and Evacuation, 18 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 381, 381
(1997) ("All abortions performed during the third trimester are the result of severe fetal abnormality or risk to the life of the pregnant woman. Women seeking later abortions do so for these
serious reasons.").
3 See NRLC, AMA's American Medical News and Public Broadcasting'sMedia Matters
Independently Report that Pro-Abortion Groups Have Badly Misled the Press and the Public
About Partial-Birth Abortions, (visited
Oct.
8,
1998) <http://www.nrlc.org/
release970225.html>; NRLC, Testimony of Douglas Johnson on Partial-BirthAbortions Oast
modified March 11, 1997) <http://www.nrlc.orglabortion/pba/test.html> [hereinafter NRLC,
Testimony of DouglasJohnson].
2 See NRLC, Testimony of Douglas Johnson, supra note 322 (describing a PBS documentary on the amount of misinformation generated by the abortion rights lobby in the partialbirth abortion debate).
324See Richard Cohen, A New Look at Late-Term Abortion, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1996, at
A17 ("[B]ehind the purported figures and the purported rationale for these abortions [1] found
something other than medical crises .... After interviewing doctors who performed late-term
abortions and surveying the literature, Brown-a physician himself-wrote: 'These doctors say
that while a significant number of their patients have late abortions for medical reasons, many
others-perhaps the majority-do not.' ...If,
in fact, most women seeking late-term abortions
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hood study reported that none of the women it surveyed had abortions
for health reasons. 32 5 Another source estimates that perhaps seven
percent of all abortions are justified on health grounds, 326 and Voinovich's Dr. Haskell admitted that over eighty percent of his D & X
procedures were purely elective.3 27
These results should hardly be surprising. Alan Guttmacher himself has admitted that there is hardly any medical condition that necessitates an abortion, at least as opposed to giving birth.32 8 This includes most maternal health conditions cited by politicians, including
heart disease and fetal deformity.32 9 Indeed, although the Court has
330
described the health exception as a core principle of Roe v. Wade,
"the evidence. . . is undisputed that except for the extremely rare (one
in a million) case of partial hydatidiform mole, there are no fetal abnormalities which cause more risk to the mother by continuing the
pregnancy to term than aborting the fetus."3 3'
3. PsychologicalImpact of Denying an Abortion
In addition to the stress and despondency caused by unwanted
births, commentators have recognized that denial of a desired abortion can have a negative psychological impact on the woman.3 32 The
Voinovich district court hypothesized a case of a woman suffering
mentally because she felt forced into aborting a defective fetus before
viability, rather than taking the chance that fetal surgery would fail
have just come to grips a bit late with their pregnancy, then the word 'choice' has been stretched
past 3a reasonable point").
2 See NRLC, ForWhat Reasons?, supranote 299.
326 See Linton, supranote 209, at 33 n.60.
32 See NRLC, Testimony of DouglasJohnson,supra note 322 (citing transcript of interview
with Dr. Martin Haskell, submitted with letter from Barbara Bolsen, editor of AM. MED. NEws,
to House Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, July 11, 1995).
32 See AAPLOG Brief, supra note 68, at 23-24 (quoting Alan Guttmacher, M.D., in THE
CASE FOR ABORTION Now 9 (Alan Guttmacher ed., 1967) ('Two or three decades ago the
common indications for legal abortion were serious disease of the heart, lung or kidney ....
Today it is possible for almost any patient to be brought through pregnancy alive unless she
suffers from a fatal illness such as cancer or leukemia and if so, abortion would be unlikely to
prolong,
much less save life.")).
3
29See id. at 24.
330
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
331Appellants' Brief, supra note 171, at 13. A hydatidiform mole is a condition in pregnant
women that causes severe eclampsia prior to twenty-four weeks of gestation, first-trimester
bleeding, enlarged uterus, blood clots, cysts and passing of grape-like vesicles. It "resembles
[an] incomplete abortion." Yong H. Hahn, M.D., Hydatiform Mole (visited Mar. 14, 1999)
<http.//chorus.rad.mcw.edu/doc/00948.html>. A "partial" hydatiform mole causes early onset
of preeclampsia, is consistent with fetal structures, and has no malignant potential. See Yong H.
Hahn, M.D., Hydatiform Mole: Types (visited Mar. 14, 1999) <http://chorus.md.mcw.edu/doc/
00947.html>.
332
See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supranote 297, at 594.
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and then being required to give birth because of a post-viability abortion ban.333 But a determination as to whether any of these facts justify termination of a viable fetus requires one to first ask whether an
abortion will help remove the source of the distress.
B. Abortion as Treatment: Is It a Curefor Mental Health
Problems?
Medical literature suggests that the psychological drawbacks of
unwanted pregnancy stem from a variety of sources, many of which
can not be helped by an abortion.
1.

UnwantedPregnanciesCause DistressRegardless of Their
Resolution

Initially, it is well-understood that the condition of pregnancy itself is stressful, and can be the source of psychological problems regardless of how it is resolved. 34 Moreover, there is no painless way
to deal with an unwanted pregnancy; societal and emotional factors
guarantee distress no matter how the pregnancy proceeds.3 35 This is
especially true for pregnant teens, for whom the fact of an unwanted
pregnancy itself presents a host of stigmatic and emotional reactions.336
The onset of pregnancy is an inevitably disconcerting situation for
any woman. Rapid and profound changes in body chemistry occur
throughout pregnancy.33 7 For many, it can be the first time in their
lives that their psychological balance is disrupted.338 Elevated endocrine levels can be a source of depression.33 9 Stress during pregnancy
333 See Women's Med. Prof 1 Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1080 (S.D. Ohio
1995). This example is significantly undermined, however, by the fact that almost no fetal
defects are ever detectable until well beyond the first trimester. See Gans Epner, supra note 24,
at 726.
334
See Warren B. Miller, An Empirical Study of the Psychological Antecedents and Consequences of Induced Abortion, 48 J. Soc. IssuEs 88 (1992); Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra
note 297, at 604 ("Unwanted pregnancy is a stressful event no matter how it is resolved."); Beit
Sjhgren, Fear of Childbirth and Psychosomatic Support, 77 ACTA OBSTETRICIA Er GyNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 819 (1998).
335 See DAvID C. REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN: SILENT No MORE 118 (1987); Adler,

Adolescent Abortion, supra note 312, at 74; Lemkau, supranote 298, at 461-63. But see BOYLE,
supra note 294, at 106 ("Claims that women are ambivalent may also be a necessary part of a
legislative system in which decision-making power about abortion lies with doctors and not with
women
336 themselves.").
See Adler, Adolescent Abortion, supra note 312, at 90.
337See ANN L DUNNEwOLD, EVALUATION & TREATMENT OF POSTPARTUM EMOTIONAL

DISORDERS
9 (1997).
338

See Sjogren, supra note 334, at 823.

339See J.L. Cox et al., Prospective Study of the PsychiatricDisorders of Childbirth, 140

BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 115 (1982).
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is often compounded by external factors,340 including spousal violence.34 ' On the whole, researchers have found a relatively high incidence of psychiatric symptoms during pregnancy, as compared to
other stages of life.342
2. Diagnosisof FetalDefect Causes Distress Regardlessof How
the PregnancyIs Resolved
In addition to being seen as a reason for abortion, the parents' distress over a fetal defect diagnosis is largely inevitable whether the
child is born or aborted. 343 To be sure, "[t]here are few if any more
ego-involving phenomena than being part of producing a child.''
When that child is wanted, it becomes a focal point for a couple's
hopes and dreams, catalyzing their inherent desire for immortality,
personal pride and appreciation for each other.345 When the fetus
turns out to be severely malformed or on the brink of inevitable death,
the plunge from this "special emotional high.., to an emotional low
is immediate and devastating." 346 Aborting the fetus can not alleviate
the psychological pain. 347 Indeed, some doctors have said that they

10

m See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supranote 297, at 604.
See id at 605.
342 See R. Kumar et al., A Prospective Study of Emotional Disorders in Childbearing
34'

Women, 144 BRIT. J. PsYcHIATRY 40 (1984).
343 See NARAL Brief, supranote 205, at 27 ("The psychological devastation a woman ex-

periences upon discovering that the fetus is unlikely to survive is immense.").
3'" M. Neil MacIntyre, Ph.D. et al., The Impact of an Abnormal Fetus or Child on the
Choice for PrenatalDiagnosisand Selective Abortion, in ABORTION, MEDICINE & THE LAW
536 (J. Douglas Buster & David F. Walbert eds., 1992).
345
See id.
34 Id. MacIntyre elaborates:
The initial reaction is a state of shock so overwhelming and confusing that the
individual appears to be living in a nightmare, a dream world, out of touch with reality. Reality is often too painful to bear, and the reaction is one of denial as a protection from the pain, a feeling that when the nightmare is over everything will somehow be all right. Some individuals avoid recognizing the full truth of reality by
viewing the tragic event as a complete blessing, thereby prolonging the avoidance of
reality. The majority of individuals soon find that they cannot avoid facing the reality of the shattering event that has so upset their lives, and at that point the predominant reactions tend to be a vacillating mixture of depression, anger and mistrust.
"Why me?" "Why us?" "What have I done to deserve this?" are the big questions.
The utter unfairness of the situation gives rise to overwhelming anger, anger at everything and everyone connected with the unfortunate event; in effect, anger at the
world. Religious faith tends to crumble under the impact of the question: "What
kind of God would do this to me?"
Id.
347 See Rhoden, NeonatalDilemma, supranote 246, at 1504 n.381.
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will refuse to abort a defective but viable fetus solely on the grounds
that its defects cause distress to the parents.348
Moreover, the mother's mental health is not the only-or even the
most common-ground on which courts and commentators justify
abortions for fetal defects. Some have argued that severe fetal defects
are a justification in themselves for abortion, independent of viability
or parental health questions. 49 This argument posits that the deformed child will never be capable of contributing to society,350 and
the pain and suffering that it will endure during its shortened life span
outweighs the state interest in preserving its life. 351 The moral criteria
for this argument are akin to those for euthanasia.352 The question
arises most often when fetuses are diagnosed with conditions like Trisomy 13 or Tay-Sachs Syndrome, in which a baby is technically viable, but will live for a few years at most, in extreme agony.353 More
difficult applications of this approach include non-lethal but inconvenient defects like Down's Syndrome (Trisomy 21). 354 Many doctors will not abort on these grounds alone. 5
This separate logic is also applied by many to pregnancies by rape
or incest. The Casey joint opinion posited that even a total ban on
356
abortion would include an exception for health, rape and incest.
Moreover, the Indiana law in Newman exempted rape and incest victims from its waiting period.357 While these types of provisions may
358
be more informed by the woman's inevitable and justified distress
than fetal defect exceptions, they nonetheless appear underlied by an
implicit assumption that the life of the fetus conceived by rape or incest is less deserving of life than others. This Comment does not express any opinion on these alternate moral conceptions of abortion; it
simply seeks to distinguish them from its discussion of the mother's
mental health.

348 See Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE

L.J. 639, 685-86 (1986) [hereinafter Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology]; see also Rhoden,
Neonatal Dilemma, supra note 246, at 1504 n.380.
349 See Rhoden, Neonatal Dilemma, supra note 246, at 1504-05.
350 See Rush, supra note 185, at 134.
3-1 See id. at 134-35.
2
35 See CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM, supra note 207, at 112.
353See Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology, supra note 348, at 687-88.
3-4See id. at 689-90.
355See id. at 686 n.222.
356
See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1992).
3-7 See A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434,
1473 (S.D. Ind. 1995)
358 Indeed, the very experience of the rape itself is perhaps the most devastating psychological experience that a woman may have. See Joan L. Hassol, Rape and Pregnancy, in
PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH AND PARENTHOOD 103 (Paul Ahmed ed., 1981).
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3. Abortion as CounterproductivePsychiatricTreatment
Some have argued that abortion in and of itself is inherently less
conducive to a woman's mental health because it is a negative, capitulatory step instead of a positive, proactive approach.35 9 A 1978
symposium of psychiatrists pronounced that "[i]n the final analysis,..
. life is better than death, and that psychotherapy which affirms life is
by far the best. Abortion is a defeatist answer, a psychic retreat for
those who have given up looking for answers., 360 Encouraging this
option has been seen as foisting blame and distrust on the woman.
Rather than affirming a woman's confidence that she can be a mother
and be successful, "many women are encouraged to abort by a society
which insists 'You can't afford a child. You're not mature or stable
enough to raise children. It is better to abort the child than force it to
is a significant
live under your inadequate care.', 36 1 Such self-blame
362
indicator of post-abortion psychological distress.
Moreover, some have noted that even when a woman chooses an
abortion, it involves some psychologically daunting decision-making.
Those who appear to have no qualms whatsoever about the decision
may well be evincing an inability or unwillingness to honestly assess
her own emotions.3 63 For these reasons, several have argued that no
responsible psychiatrist would ever recommend that a patient have an

abortion.364
..
9See REARDON, supra note 335, at 135.
36o Id. at 137.
361 Id.

at 127; see also Anne Speckhard, PostabortionSyndrome: An Emerging Public

Health Concern, 48 J. Soc. IssuEs 95, 96 (1992) (arguing that the politicization of abortion
psychology research generates self-stigma in the woman who experiences psychological symptoms3 that psychologists tell her she should not have).
6See Brenda Major, PsychosocialPredictorsofAdjustment to Abortion, 48 J. Soc. IssuEs
121, 137 (1992).
363See REARDON, supranote 335, at 139-41.
34 See id. at 142. Reardon also quotes Dr. Fred E. Mecklenburg, Professor of Obstetrics
and Gynecology at the University of Minnesota Medical School and member of the American
Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians, as saying:
There are no known psychiatric diseases which can be cured by abortion. In addition there are none which can be predictably improved by abortion... [Instead], it
may leave unresolved conflicts coupled with guilt and added depression which may
be more harmful than the continuation of the preguancy.
Furthermore, there is good evidence to suggest that serious mental disorders
arise following abortions more often in women with real psychiatric problems.
Paradoxically, the very women for whom legal abortion may seem most justifiable
are also the ones for whom the risk is highest for post-abortion psychic insufficiency
When abortion is substituted for adequate psychiatric care-and there is ample
evidence to suggest that this is already happening-there is a distinct danger of
minimizing established psychotherapeutic principles. Unfortunately, it is the distressed woman who ultimately faces the dulling impact of this minimization. She is
the one who cries for help, and she is also the one who is turned away.
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4. Mental Health Justificationsfor Abortion Are Less Compelling
in the Post-Viability Context
All of these considerations are heightened in the post-viability
context. The first trimester, when the overwhelming majority of decisions to abort are made, is the most vulnerable time for pregnancyinduced depression. 65 If a legally cognizable mental health reason
for abortion is likely to exist, it is medically unlikely to exist after the
fetus becomes viable.
This point is best illustrated by the litany of examples put forth by
abortion rights activists during the partial-birth abortion debates. The
Voinovich district court, for example, relied on the experiences of two
"Jane Does" to justify the need for the D & X procedure after viability. The fetuses aborted by each woman, however, were deformed
severely enough that they were incapable of life outside the womb
(and ipso facto not viable) despite their gestational age.366 The National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL)
amicus brief in Voinovich told the emotionally wrenching stories of
twelve separate women whose deformed fetuses were aborted by the
D & X method, but because all of these babies were either already
367
dead or incapable of independent life, not a single one was viable.
Id. at 169.
Similarly, Reardon quotes the World Health Organization as warning that "the very women
for whom legal abortion is considered justified on psychiatric grounds are the ones who have the
highest risk of post-abortion psychiatric disorders." Id. Finally, the World Medical Journal is
quoted as saying "[abortion] is a bad way of treating true psychiatric disease ....Investigation
shows that there is less psychological trauma associated with normal birth than there is with
legal abortion." Id.
365See Kumar et al., supra note 342, at 40.
36 See Appellants' Brief, supra note 171, at 17-18 nn.10-11 (explaining that neither
of
these fetuses were viable); NARAL Brief, supra note 205, at 10-12 (recounting the stories of
Jane Does 1 & 2).
367See NARAL Brief, supra note 205, at 29 (Tammy Watts) ("my baby was going
to die"),
id. at 29-30 (Diane Reiner) ("it had no proper brain, no proper lungs ...its organs were not
properly inside its body cavity... its spine was bent at a 45 degree angle, and... its extremities
were also deformed."), id. at 30 (Phyllis Baker) ([The child] "wouldn't be able to live long
enough to do anything but suffer"), id. (Jane Doe 2) ("this baby would not live"), id. at 33 n.13
(Jane Doe 1) ("the fetus stood an 80% chance of dying when born and, even if he survived birth,
would probably not live to be two years old"); id. app. p. 2 ("[i]n addition to a fluid-filled nonfunctional brain, he had a malformed heart with a large hole between the chambers ....He had
also developed an extremely large cyst filled with intestinal matter, and.., severe brain damage.... [T]hese symptoms added up to Trisomy 13, a fatal chromosonal disorder"), id app. p.
11 (Coreen Costello) ("it doesn't look like this baby has any hope"), id app. p. 24 (Erica Fox)
("[t]he fetus had stopped growing .... Phrases like 'severe mental retardation' and 'short,
painful life followed by death' were just a couple of the things I heard."), idt app. p. 44 (Sophie
Horak) ("Joey was going to die and.., there was nothing more that could be done."), id app. p.
48 (Nancy Jenkins) ("ifthe fetus was [sic] alive it would be severally [sic] deformed" (emphasis
added)), id. app. p. 54 (Mary-Dorothy Line) ("A hydrocephalic baby that advanced has no
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Nor were any of the women who stood with President Clinton at his
"veto ceremony" for the Partial Birth Abortion Act carrying viable
fetuses when they aborted. 68 Evacuating a dead fetus or a fetus with
anecephalia (a liquid-filled cranium with no brain), which many of
had, is not even an "abortion" in legal or medical
these fetuses
9
terms.

36

Moreover, in all but the most extreme examples of denial and delay, a woman will realize that she is pregnant well before the point of

viability, which is generally recognized to occur between the twenty-

second and twenty-sixth week of gestation 37 0° and under the Ohio

statute was presumed after twenty-four weeks.371 Viability occurs
shortly after "quickening," when the woman first feels her baby

kick.372 As Justice Blackmun noted, this gives the woman more than
adequate time to exercise her pre-viability liberty interest in obtaining
an abortion before her rights are eclipsed by the interests of the
state.373 After viability, a mental health justification for an abortion is
less compelling because it is less likely to be either genuine or unavoidable.
C. The PsychologicalImpactfrom Abortion
To make a balanced assessment of a post-viability mental health
exception, one must also consider the possible ways in which an
abortion intended to ameliorate mental distress may or may not succeed. Two caveats must be kept in mind when evaluating the data in
this section. First, both the imprecise nature of psychiatry and the
volatility of abortion opinions make research on the psychological
hope"), id. app. p. 60 (Vicki Stella) ("[hie never would have survived outside my womb"), id.
app. p. 70 (Viki Wilson) ("she would not survive outside my womb").
In addition, these stories may have constituted inadmissible hearsay, offered for the first
time at the appellate level, that should not have been considered by the court. See Appellants'
Brief, supra note 171, at 18 n.1 1.
'6' See NRLC, Testimony of Douglas Johnson, supranote 322.
69See Gans Epner, supranote 24, at 725; Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology, supranote
348, at 686-87.
370
See Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 515 (upholding a Missouri law
effectively creating a presumption of viability at 20 weeks); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160
(asserting viability at 24-28 weeks); Appellants' Brief, supra note 171, at 12 (22-24 weeks);
CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM, supra note 207, at 111 (generally accepted point of viability
in United Kingdom is 24 weeks, and a legal presumption of viability at 28 weeks); Gans Epner,
supra note 24, at 724 (20-27 weeks is a "gray zone" of viability); Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Abortion and Fetal Viability (last visited Oct. 8, 1998)
<http:l/www.plannedparenthood.orgllibrary/ABORTION/fetalviability.htnl> (stating that generally accepted point of viability is 24 weeks).
37 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(C) (Anderson 1998).
3 See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 932 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
373
See id. at 932-33, (citing Webster, 492 U.S. at 553-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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effects of abortion among the most biased in the field.3 74 An early
survey of such studies over a thirty-year period found generalizations,
misquotes and evident bias from researchers on both sides of the issue. 375 This bias is often evident in the ways in which authors define
their terms376 and characterize their findings.377 For example, some
researchers have dismissed outright any ambivalent opinion on abortion from any woman in their samples, treating them as cultural myths
that must be refuted.378 Others, especially before Roe was decided,
have demonstrated an untested assumption that abortion is always a
negative experience.37 Some have observed that although research
abounds on the psychology of abortion, relatively few studies use
sound methodology. 38 0 Researchers have not been able to find common ground, because they rely on tainted data and inflexible policy
positions.38 ' Psychological debate has reached an impasse, because
many are attempting to uncover conclusive evidence one way or the
other, and refusing under the guise of objectivity to acknowledge the
vital role of policy and personal values in resolving the question.3 82
Second, reliable data on the psychological impact of abortion are
incomplete although there appears to have been many studies conducted on the subject. 383 Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop,
who had headed a presidential commission on the psychological sequelae of abortion, recognized these flaws when he refused to issue
an official report on the grounds that the evidence did not warrant any
conclusion. 384 One major flaw in the studies is their short-term focus.385 As of 1990, there were no such studies that examined the
374 See BErrY SARVIS ET AL., THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 105 (1974); Russo,
U.S.
Abortion in Context, supra note 307, at 185.
375See SARVIS, supra note 374, at 112.
376 See REARDON, supranote 335, at 115.
377See BOYLE, supranote 294, at 3; Richard A. Schwartz, M.D., Abortion on Request: The
PsychiatricImplications,in ABORTION, MEDICINE & THE LAw 330 (J. Douglas Butler & David
F. Walbert eds., 3d ed. 1986).
378See BOYLE, supranote 294, at 103.
379See HYMAN RODMAN Er AL., THE ABORTION QUESTION 72 (1987); Susan J. Blumen-

thaI, Psychiatric Consequences of Abortion: Overview of Research Findings, in PSYCHIATRIC

ASPECTS OF ABORTION 21 (Nada L. Stotland ed., 1991).
380

See Nancy E. Adler, Unwanted Pregnancy and Abortion: Definitionaland Research Is-

sues, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 19, 33 (1992) [hereinafter Adler, Unwanted Pregnancy]; Gregory H.
Wilmoth et al., Prevalenceof PsychologicalRisks Following Legal Abortion in the U.S.: Limits

of the Evidence, 49 . Soc. ISSUES 37, 61 (1992) [hereinafter Wilmoth et al., Limits of the Evidence].
381See BOYLE, supra note 294, at 130.

382 See id. at 133; SARVIS, supra note 374, at 106.
383See RODMAN ET AL., supra note 379, at 75.
384 See BOYLE, supra note 294, at 129-30; Gregory H. Wilmoth, Abortion, Public Health
Policy, and Informed Consent Legislation,48 J. Soc. ISSUES 1, 2 (1992) [hereinafter Wilmoth,

Informed Consent].
385 see REARDON, supra note 335, at 116; Melton et al., supra note 311, at 16.
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emotional aftereffects of abortion for more than two years; the majority of studies survey women only a few short hours after the procedure.386 These data are skewed by the emotional numbness, relief and
retreat that many women demonstrate immediately after an abortion.387 Additionally, many studies do not distinguish the effects of
abortion from those of the unwanted pregnancy.
Psychological
389
studies on minors who have abortions are especially lacking.
With these principles in mind, this Comment does not seek to use
the following data to settle the issue conclusively. Studies will be
cited "as is," with no representation being made as to their reliability.
Indeed, advocates on both sides of the issue have undermined their
own arguments in the past by asserting flawed studies as "proof' of
their policy positions.390 While it can be noted that the research gives
ammunition to both sides of the debate, 391 in the final analysis, psychological survey data, no matter how accurate, can only inform, not
decide, our policy decisions in the abortion field.392 In the postviability focus of this Comment, however, the data as a whole suggest
that late-term abortions may do more harm to mental health, and for
policymakers it is more useful to have knowledge of relative risk than
of absolute risk.393 The risk factors discussed below should give
pause to those who would reflexively advocate an abortion as a solution for the stress of an unwanted pregnancy.
1. The Evidence Against a Negative PsychologicalImpactfrom
Abortion
As nearly all researchers will admit, any surgical procedure has
psychological risks.394 But several researchers have reported that the
psychological detriment to women who undergo abortions is minimal

386 See Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological Responses After Abortion, 248 SCL 41, 43
(1990) [hereinafter Adler et al., PsychologicalResponses].
387 See REARDON, supra note 335, at 117.
388 See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at 614.
389 See Adler, Adolescent Abortion, supra note 312, at 83; Melton et al., supra note 311, at
16.
390 See WV'lmoth, Informed Consent, supra note 384, at 4. Wilmoth further opines that in
general, studies cited by "pro-choice" advocates tend to be more methodologically sound than
those cited by those on the "pro-life" side. See id.; see also Blumenthal, supra note 379, at 28
(arguing that only a few studies use sound methodology, and they tend to be the ones showing
no negative emotional sequelae).
391See SARVis, supra note 374, at 108.
392 See BOYLE, supranote 294, at 136.
'9' See Wnimoth et al., Limits of the Evidence, supra note 380, at 55.
394See SARVIS, supra note 374, at 105.
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at best.395 This includes studies that are purported to be the largest
and most comprehensive on the topic. 396 Although some of these
authors use conclusory language that exposes a possible pro-abortion
bias on occasion,397 their data reveal no causal link between abortion
and psychosis as a general matter. 398 Especially highlighted by these
studies, is the importance of free choice, as their data indicates that
any perceived compromise of a woman's freedom to choose an abortion significantly
increases the likelihood of psychological symp9
toms.

39

These studies heavily refute the suggestion that there is a diagnos4°
able post-traumatic stress disorder in women who have abortions. 0
While Dr. Koop's commission did not release official findings, he did
testify before Congress that abortion opponents use as one of "their
weapons the fact that there is such a thing as a postabortion syndrome
..,.As we have talked to various groups, there is no doubt that there
are people who experience a post-abortion syndrome, but there are
people who have a post-death-of-my-child syndrome, ,ost-death-ofmy-mother syndrome, post-lost-my-job syndrome ....
Indeed, some authors have argued that abortion can have a positive effect on a woman's psyche. Benefits include a sense of personal
empowerment and smaller family size. 402 These effects have been
noted for women as well as minors. 4 03 It has also been argued that
even portraying abortion as a negative emotional experience is a detriment to mental health.404 Nevertheless, a substantial number of psychology researchers have argued that abortion can be mentally damaging to a woman in many contexts, at least more so than childbirth.4 °5

395See Adler et al., PsychologicalResponses, supranote 386, at 41; Blumenthal, supra note
379, at 22, 24-27 (collecting studies); Lemkau, supra note 298, at 462.
396 See RODMAN Er AL-, supra note 379, at 79; Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note

297, at 612.
397See Marecek, supranote 311, at 110; Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at
613,616.
398
See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supranote 297, at 615.
399See REARDON, supra note 335, at 132; Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at
614.
400 See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at 617.
401 Id. at 619; see also Wilmoth et al.,
Limits of the Evidence, supra note 380, at 38 (discrediting findings of a post-abortion syndrome). But see Speckhard, supra note 361, at 98 (disagreeing with Dr. Koop's dismissal of a post-abortion syndrome).
4m See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at 617.
4o3See Marecek, supranote 311, at 110.
4 See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at 618.
405See infra Part IV(C)(2).
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2. The Evidencefor Psychologically DamagingEffects of
Abortion
"Researchers tend to agree that, at some level, abortion is a stressful experience for all women. ' ,406 A number of studies have purported
to demonstrate a higher incidence of psychological difficulties after
abortions than after childbirth.4 These include a Danish study demonstrating a higher rate of psychiatric illnesses after abortions than
births, 4°8 and a Finnish study that found the suicide rate among
women who had aborted was three times the national average and six
times above the rate of women who had given birth.409 Negative effects in American studies include undermined romantic and maternal
relationships, increased suicide risk, a lingering sense of loss, rage,
etc.4 1°
As some have argued, even the one percent risk demonstrated by
some studies is a non-negligible result.4 11 Of the 1.5 million women
who undergo abortion annually, "that means that each year 15,000
women are so severely scarred by post-abortion trauma that they become unable to function normally. Since this one percent figure is by
far the lowest claimed anywhere in the literature, the actual rate of
disabling sequelae is probably much higher.' '4 12 Statistics, moreover,
are only an imprecise measurement of actual human suffering.4 13 The
fact that these studies are conducted in diverse populations from Finland to Japan indicate that post-abortion guilt and depression are not a
peculiar hang-up of Western or Judeo-Christian culture.4 14
The data available on the long-term effects indicate that the relief
and sense of empowerment common immediately after an abortion
tend to fade over time. One group of researchers studying the emotional sequelae of childbirth was surprised to discover a "highly significant correlation" between antenatal depression and mothers who
had ended previous pregnancies in abortion. 415 This "dormant grief
reaction" manifested itself in conflicting expressions of worry and
retribution towards their later child, and was consistent in women
406 Speckhard, supranote 361, at 104 (citing the American Psychiatric Association).
40 See REARDON, supra note 335, at 119; Speckhard, supranote 361, at 96.
4m See CIBA FOUNDATION SyMPOSIUM, supra note 207, at 118-19..
40 See Mika Gissler et al., Suicides After Pregnancy in Finland,1987-94: Register Linkage
Study, 313 BRrr. MED. L 1431, 1433 (1996).
410 See REARDON, supra note 335, at 123-30.
411See id at 121.
412Id. But see wimoth et al., Limits of the Evidence, supra note 380, at 44 (indicting Rear-

don's413methodology).
See REARDON, supra note 335, at 121.
414See id at 122.
415 See Kumar et al., supranote 342, at 42.
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whose abortions had been both legal and illegal.416 Additional studies
have also suggested that other subsequent events occurring long after
the abortion can trigger negative emotional symptoms, 417 including
the onset of menopause. 418 There is a particular dearth of research
data, however, on these delayed grief reactions.4 19
These results are particularly poignant in comparison to the emotional sequelae of birth. As is commonly known, depression can occur in the post-partum period. 420 It is estimated that 40,000 women
annually have some form of post-partum psychological symptoms, 421
and eighty percent of women giving birth experience post-partum
symptoms to some degree.422 Giving birth has also been found to
trigger other types of depression, though not necessarily caused by the
birth itself.423 Post-partum psychoses, though extremely rare, have
occurred; because they are biologically induced, however, they have
been successfully treated with drugs. 424 At least one study has concluded that these effects are temporary, and that the experience usually benefits a woman's overall mental health. 425
While no psychology researcher is likely to agree with all of the
data presented in this Part, there are certain areas in which studies on
both sides of the issue appear to converge. This includes one area of
particular relevance to the basic inquiry of this Comment-late-term
abortions.
3. Areas of Convergence in the Research
One fact on which almost all researchers appear to agree is that the
woman's perception that her choice is uncoerced is an important factor in preventing negative emotional sequelae from abortion.4 26 As
seen above, many authors phrase this finding in terms that would
suggest a scientific basis for liberalized access to abortion. But these
data have significant implications for those who are predisposed to
recommend an abortion as well. Indeed, one study cautioned practitioners against assuming that a woman's abortion decision has been
416 See

id.

417 See Lemkau, supranote 298, at 468; Speckhard, supra note 361, at 108.
418 See REARDON, supra note 335, at 116.
419 See Blumenthal, supra note 379, at 32; Major, supra note 362, at 136.
420 See Cox et al., supra note 339, at 114.
421 See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 337, at v.
422

See id. at 28.

423See Kumar et al., supranote 342, at 35.
42 See DUNNEWOLD, supranote 337, at 16.
425 See Gissler, supranote 409, at 1431.
426 See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at 615.
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made freely, and found that the psychological aftereffects of a coerced decision to abort were comparable to post-traumatic stress disorder.4 27 Other studies have confirmed these findings.428
The threat of coercion is quite tangible when a woman's partner
persuades her to abort against her wishes. Eighty-five percent of
women, by one accounting, discuss the decision with their husband or
partner before making a choice.42 9 Another study found that twentythree percent of women choosing to abort cited their partner's disapproval of the pregnancy as a factor in their decision. 430 It can be assumed that a substantial number of women, then, are obtaining abortions not entirely of their own choosing, with devastating psychological results.
The potential for coercion is especially great with a pregnant minor.4 31 Research indicates that minors are often under strong pressure
from both parents and boyfriends to abort, often against their own
desires. 432 Perhaps as a result, minors who abort face a greater risk of
suicide.4 33 The Supreme Court has articulated three reasons why minors should be treated differently than adults: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
3
child rearng."
All three of these factors invite psychological
435

analysis.

Perhaps the one fact that seems nearly axiomatic in the psychological literature on abortion is that the later in the pregnancy one
aborts, the greater the woman's risk for negative emotional sequelae.43 6 This is true for a number of reasons. The procedure itself
is physically riskier in the late-term, and the fact that the fetus is so
developed and has moved makes the choice more difficult morally as
well.4 37 The fact that a woman has waited until the late-term to obtain
427See Lenkau, supranote 298, at 468.
4

4228
9 See

Schwartz, supranote 377, at 330.
See BOYLE, supra note 294, at 105.
10 See id at 125.
431See Adler, Adolescent Abortion, supra note 312, at 77. But see Melton et al., supra note
311, at 11 (disagreeing with the suggestion that abortion is always more difficult for a minor
than an adult).
432 See Elizabeth Scott, Legal and Ethical Issues in Counseling Pregnant Adolescents, in
4

ADOLESCENT
ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 123 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986).
433

See Adler, Adolescent Abortion, supranote 312, at 84.
Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,634 (1979).
See Melton et al., supranote 311, at 9.
436See Shalia Misri, Second-TrimesterAbortion, in PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF ABORTION
166-68 (Nada L. Stotland ed., 1991); Russo, Psychological Aspects, supra note 297, at 612;
Speckhard, supra note 361, at 114.
437See BOYLE, supranote 294, at 121; Adler, Adolescent Abortion, supranote 312, at 75;
Lemkau, supranote 298, at 467; Melton et al., supra note 311, at 21.
4
4335
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an abortion can itself indicate conflicting emotions about the procedure, which in turn magnifies the anguish felt over the decision.4 38
Broken relationships are also a reason for late-term abortions, and are
themselves an independent risk factor for negative sequelae.439 Because almost all fetal defects are found late in the pregnancy, 440 many
late-term abortions are also performed for that reason. These women
are particularly susceptible to feelings of animosity, because the
abortion is done for the baby's sake despite the mother's desire to
have the child.441
Even the studies concluding that abortion per se is not a mental
health risk factor often concede that late-term abortions are an exception. 4 2 Some of the studies listed above do not even include in their
samples abortions performed after the first trimester. 443 At least three
Supreme Court Justices, relying on medical literature, have also recognized the psychological dangers of late-term abortions. 44 Because
post-viability abortions pose much greater risks of mortalitY" 5 and
psychiatric morbidity," 6 then, mental health is a factor that weighs in
favor of the state's compelling interest in preserving the mother's
health by restricting abortion availability.
D. Summary: What Does the PsychologicalLiteratureReveal
About the RelationshipBetween Abortion and Mental Health?
None of the above studies are conclusive. Because psychology
and psychiatry are necessarily inexact sciences, this research can only
indicate risk factors. It can not predicate with complete accuracy
when or how severely a particular woman will suffer emotionally.
But can it reveal what might lead a woman to succumb to psychological pressures? Is there a difference in the segments of the population

438 See Major, supra note 362, at 125; Adler et al., Psychological Responses, supra note
386, at 42; Lemkau, supranote 298, at 467.
439 See Lemkau, supranote 298, at 468.
440 See Gans Epner, supra note 24, at 726.
441See
442See

REARDON, supranote 335, at 176; Lemkau, supra note 298, at 467.
BOYLE, supra note 294, at 105; Russo, Psychological Aspects, supra note 297, at

615.
443 See, e.g., Lemkau, supranote 298, at 462-63 (citing only first-trimester studies); Misri,
supranote 436, at 159 (observing that most literature focuses on the first trimester).
44 See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 467 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
445 See Gans Epner, supra note 24, at 727; see also Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865,
873 (D. Utah 1992) (observing that on the record of that case, no physician performed an abortion after 20 weeks gestational age, because of the physical risks to the mother).
446 See Gans Epner, supranote 24, at 727.
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most susceptible to negative sequelae from an unwanted birth and
from an abortion?
The literature points to a number of considerations that can influence whether an abortion is psychologically damaging to a woman.
These include her general ability to cope with stress, her age and her
personal attitudes toward abortion before the procedure. 447 A
woman's self-confidence and the perceived social support of others
are also important." 8 Indeed, the most accurate indicator of postabortion psychosis is a woman's pre-abortion symptoms.449 Thus, a
woman in a high-risk group for severe distress, such as one who
aborts after viability because of a fetal defect, may suffer no clinically
diagnosable sequelae if she is a strong person, generally capable of
dealihg with stress, and has a number of close friends to support her.
By the same token, not all women with unwanted pregnancies will
suffer the mental distress cited by some as justification for an abortion. Not all women will develop psychiatric illness when their fetus
is diagnosed with defects.4 50 And those women who do suffer psychologically before and during pregnancy are also those who demonstrate the most psychological complications after an abortion. 451 Indeed, for women who suffer psychologically before or during pregnancy, the risk factors for negative emotional sequelae appear to be
the same after birth or abortion.4 52
The implications of this information for the necessity of a mental
health exception should be obvious. Proponents of the exception are
faced with this paradox: Either a woman is mentally fragile and vulnerable during an unwanted pregnancy, in which case having an
abortion is Jlikely to only aggravate her condition, or the woman is
strong, self-confident and supported, in which case her mental health
should not be threatened by delivering her child.453 This result is all
the more true in the post-viability context, where the complicating
447 See Adler et al., Psychological Responses, supra note 386, at 42; Lemkau, supra note
298, at 465.
4 See Russo, Psychological Aspects, supra note 297, at 617; Major, supra note 362, at

130.
449 See Adler et al., Psychological Responses, supra note 386, at 43; Lemkau, supra note
298, at 466; Major, supranote 362, at 135; Nada L Stotland, M.D., PsychiatricIssues in Abortion, and the Implications of Recent Legal Changesfor PsychiatricPractice, in PSYCHIATRIC
ASPECTS OF ABORTON 3 (Nada L. Stotland, M.D. ed., 1991).
45) See Rhoden, Neonatal Dilemma, supranote 246, at 1504.
4s' See DUNNEWOLD, supra note 337, at 17; REARDON, supra note 335, at 169-70;
Schwartz, supra note 377, at 328.
452 See Adler, Adolescent Abortion, supra note 312, at 84; Russo, Psychological Aspects,
supra note 297, at 625; Schwartz, supranote 377, at 331.
453 See REARDON, supra note 335, at 170 ("This may seem like a neat little Catch-22 invented by anti-abortionists, but it is a fact confirmed not only by medical experts but by common sense as well").
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emotional factors of late-term abortions described above become particularly acute even for the psychically stable woman, and potentially
devastating for an emotionally fragile one.
In addition to the dubious scientific support for a post-viability
mental health exception, policymakers must always remember that in
this context, the state's interests in both the woman's health and the
fetal life have become compelling, overriding the woman's liberty
interest.454 The potential threats to a woman's health from the abortion procedure have been covered above, and the state's deep moral
and pragmatic interests in the life of the fetus have been well-covered
elsewhere. 455 The Voinovich controversy, however, clarifies additional facets of those interests.
E. Two Additional State Interests that Are ParticularlyAcute in
Post-Viability Context: Cruelty to the Fetus and the
Impact on the Third Parties
1. Cruelty to the Fetus: Can It Feel Pain?
The Ohio statute cited prevention of cruelty to the fetus as one of
its motivations.4 56 The Voinovich court was the first to address this
issue.457 The argument was based on medical evidence that the fetus
can feel pain when it is aborted, and especially when the D & X procedure is used.
The district court's rejection of the fetal pain argument was a legally dubious decision. Judge Rice acknowledged the evidence that
fetuses can feel pain, and even discredited the Plaintiffs' expert, Dr.
Haskell, because he was not a neurology expert.4 58 Nonetheless,
Judge Rice cast the issue of whether the fetus was sufficiently conscious to experience pain as a matter of conscience, on which reasonable people could disagree. 459 Accepting this proposition, however,
changes nothing in the post-viability context.46 0 Because the state can
4

4 See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
4ss A very abbreviated sample of this literature includes: Casey, 505 U.S. at 914-15 (Stevens, J., concurring in part); Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 794 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 100 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); William W. Van Alstyne, The Cycle of
ConstitutionalUncertainty in American Abortion Law, in ABORTION, MEDICINE & THE LAWv 87
(J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 1992); CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 207, at 115; Rhoden, Neonatal Dilemma, supra note 246, at 1484 n.271; Rush, supra note
185, at 134 n. 108; Cohen, supra note 324, at A17.
456 See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1071 (S.D. Ohio
1995).
457 See id. at 1072.
411 See id. at 1072 n.28.
4-9 See id. at 1073.
460 Ohio, of course, also used this argument to justify theD & X ban. See id. at 1071.
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ban post-viability abortions anyway, subject only to the life or health
exception, there seems to be no reason why a state can not rationally
determine that there is sufficient evidence of fetal cruelty to justify a
post-viability ban.
Judge Rice's ultimate characterization of the fetal pain issue as
purely a matter of conscience is an intellectual retreat, not a compromise. To be sure, many aspects of the abortion debate are necessarily
matters of conscience. Because we have no demonstrable method of
proving whether a fetus is a "person" imbued with an immortal soul,
or whether killing it is morally wrong, these matters can only be decided by personal belief (and perhaps a transcendent Judgement).
Fetal pain, however, is a question whose answer has a direct consequence in this life. If a fetus does feel pain, regardless of whether it is
a person in every sense of the term or what happens to its essence after death, it is still a living creature suffering tremendous agony. Indeed, few, if any of those who advocate fetal personhood would characterize animals as "persons" that have "souls," but society as a
whole considers the needless infliction of pain on an animal to be
cruel and inhumane.
This question is one that can be answered with scientific evidence,
and a distinct majority of such literature suggests that fetuses do indeed suffer pain in the womb.461 Several commentators have, in fact,
drawn an analogy between what they have witnessed in the fetus and
animal cruelty. 462 Associate Professor of pediatrics and anesthesia
Jean Wright at Emory University testified before Congress that fetuses are more susceptible to pain than infants, and lamented that
"this [partial birth abortion] procedure, if it were done on an animal in
my institution, would not make it through the institutional review
' 63
A
process. The animal would be more protected than the child is.
A number of factors suggest that fetuses can feel pain, at least by
the twentieth week of gestation. 464 Fetuses who experience unpleas461See AAPLOG Brief, supranote 68, at ill-v, 11-12 (collecting authorities); James Bopp,
Jr., Partial-BirthAbortion: The FinalFrontierof Abortion Jurisprudence,14 IssuEs L. & MED.

3, 35-40 (same).
462
See Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 477 (7th Cir. 1998) (Manion, J.,
dissenting) ("An uncaged animal does not suffer less when shot as compared to a caged animal,
but Wisconsin still criminalizes the latter and not the former... [Tihe court overextends when
it concludes that there is no moral difference between partial birth abortion and other abortion
procedures."); L.G. Almeda, Comment: Michigan'sBan on Partial-BirthAbortions: Balancing
Competing Interests, 74 U. Dar. MERcY L. REv. 685, 705 (1997) ("[Olne who believes that a
human fetus is morally equivalent to a cow, pig, or other animal could believe that there is a
legitimate governmental purpose in not unnecessarily subjecting living creatures to pain or
cruelty, even in the process of killing them.").
4
NRLC, Some Key Facts on Partial-Birth Abortions (ast modified Jan. 8, 1996)
<http://www.nrlc.orglabortion/pba/pbakey.html> (quoting Prof. Jean Wright).
464
See AAPLOG Brief, supra note 68, at 9-15; Appellants' Brief, supranote 171, at 11-12.
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ant stimuli in the womb have exhibited all of the same reflex reactions that a born person would,465 and tend to move away from the
source of the stimuli. 466 Indeed, there is a good deal of evidence that
fetuses actually have a higher sensitivity to pain than born persons, 467
because the fetuses have developed enough nerves to transmit the
pain impulses, but lack the physical and chemical coping mechanisms
to handle the sensations. 468 The fetus's small size provides a shorter
distance for the impulses to travel and hence less opportunity to degrade. 469 Fetal surgeries must use relatively more painkillers than
other humans would require for similar procedureso 7 Scientific concern regarding fetal pain has grown to the point that the United Kingdom now
mandates by law that painkilling drugs be used in fetal sur471
gery.
No witness in congressional hearings on this subject offered convincing evidence against the fetal pain theory,472 and the record in
Voinovich was more than sufficient to prove its case.473 Still, arguments have been made against the fetal pain theory. One holds that
fetal nerves have not undergone sufficient mylenation,474 or development, to transmit pain impulses. 475 Evidence suggests that at least by
the twentieth week of gestation, however, nerves are as developed as
adults with a condition that degrades their nerves to similar levels and
who can still feel pain.47 6 Even if the mylenation of fetal nerves is
incomplete, however, the impulses have a much shorter distance 4to
77
travel than in adults, so that much more of the sensation will be felt.
It has also been suggested that the anesthesia given to the mother
before an abortion numbs or even kills the fetus before the procedure

465
6 See AAPLOG Brief, supra note 68, at 10-12.
4

See id. at 10.

467 See id at 10-16.
4See

id at 15-16.

46 See id at 11 n.4.
470 See id. at 16. "
47' See McCullough, supra note 305.
472 See Almeda, supranote 462, at 706-07; Massie, supra note 321, at 348-50.
473 See Appellants' Brief, supranote 171, at 29.
474 "Mylenation" is the process of acquiring (or in the case of fetuses, developing) myelin, a

white, fatty substance that acts as "a thick medullary sheath" around the nerve fibers. See
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1494 (1986). This sheath plays an important role in transmitting nerve impulses. A breakdown of myelin in adults leads to diseases
such as multiple sclerosis, and "remylenation" techniques are being developed to treat such
diseases. See Jo-Ann Chinn, Exciting News From the Myelin Project (vistited Feb. 24, 1999)
<http://aspin.asu.edu/rnsnews/chinnl.htm>.
475
See AAPLOG Brief, supranote 68, at 9.
476See id.
477 See id at 11 n.4.
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takes place.478 This idea, however, has been roundly refuted by a
number of knowledgeable physicians and commentators. 479 Indeed,
there is no evidence that either a local anaesthetic480 or one given intravenously 481 has any measurable effect on the fetus, much less that
it kills it. Another assertion is that the fetus dies after its umbilical
cord is cut, as it usually is in preparation for the D & X procedure.4 82
While this will eventually kill the fetus by asphyxiation, death takes
As Dr. Haskell
anywhere from five to twenty minutes to occur.
himself has conceded, 48 an abortion provider does not always cut the
cord4 85 or wait for the fetus to die,48 and the fetus is typically alive
and unanestheitized when it begins to be dismembered.4 87
To be sure, there are those who disagree with the theory that fe-

tuses feel pain. 488 Even the Supreme Court has echoed Judge Rice's
approach and declined to reach a conclusion, citing the issue's indeterminacy.48 9 Some legal writers, moreover, have disturbingly
evinced both ignorance and bias on the subject.4 90 The Voinovich
Appellees' brief countered that even if the fetus did feel pain, that
interest is outweighed by the risk to the mother's health. 491 Not only

is this viewpoint particularly misplaced in the post-viability context,
as argued above, but such statements demonstrate an unsettling refusal to even contemplate the possibility of giving credence to fetal
suffering. It is perhaps telling to wonder whether such persons take

478See NARAL

Brief, supra note 205, at 10; NRLC, Testimony of DouglasJohnson, supra

note 322.
479 See AAPLOG Brief, supra note 68, at 18; Massie, supranote 321, at 352; McCullough,
supranote 305.
40 See AAPLOG Brief, supra note 68, at 17; NRLC, Testimony of Douglas Johnson, supra
note 322.
481 See AAPLOG Brief, supranote 68, at 17.
482 See Roman, supranote 321, at 382 ("The truth is that neurological fetal demise is induced well before the procedure begins or early in the procedure.").
4 See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1066 (S.D. Ohio
1995); AAPLOG Brief, supra note 68, at 7.
4 See AAPLOG Brief, supranote 68, at 19.
4'5 See id. at 7.
46 See Appellants' Brief, supra note 171, at 11-12; Nebraska Brief, supra note 171, at 4
n.2.
487 See AAPLOG Brief, supranote 68, at 8.
488
See id. at 6 (quoting Dr. Haskell); Appellees' Brief, supranote 205, at 9, 33; Massie, supra note 321, at 352.
489 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,443 n.34 (1983).
490 See Massie, supranote 321, at 348-49 (dismissing out of hand the testimony of the most
qualified witness on the subject because he "conceded that he was opposed to all abortion,"
while accepting at face value the witness produced by the National Abortion Federation); Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology, supranote 348, at 663 (making an unsupported assertion that
"[the viable fetus has no more capability for self-awareness or feeling pain than a pre-viable
fetus").
491 See Appellees' Brief, supranote 205, at 33.
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the same dim view of an animal's suffering inflicted in the name of
sport, testing drugs or designing better cosmetics.
Finally, as Judge Rice pointed out in the context of the D & X ban,
if one method of abortion is painful, certainly all of them are.492
While this is logical, what response should it dictate? Judge Rice
suggested, again in the D & X context, that abortionists be required to
wait a sufficient period of time after cutting the umbilical cord for the
fetus to die of asphyxiation.4 93 NARAL, on the other hand, fears that
giving any credence to fetal pain could lead to the prohibition of all
abortions. 494 Falling somewhere in between, another commentator
has suggested that while the fetal pain issue can not be dismissed out
of hand, any response to it should be an even-handed one that applies
to all abortion procedures. 495 While the place of the fetal pain issue in
the nation's overall abortion jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this
Comment, it is sufficient to say here that it deserves more attention
from policymakers than it has received thus far.
2. PsychologicalImpact on Third Parties
If the broad Vuitch sense of health is to be imported into the postviability context, it seems only fair to carry the definition to its logical
conclusion. Specifically, Doe speaks of a woman's "familial" wellbeing as a facet of her health.496 As we have seen above, eighty-five
percent of women discuss their abortion decision with their husbands
or partners, 497 and twenty-three percent cite coercion from these men
as a factor in their decision to abort. 498 Fathers are thus not only
likely to be aware of the abortion, but their reaction then becomes a
crucial influence on the woman's own mental well-being.499 The
Court has also recognized that abortion is a unique decision fraught
with consequences for others beyond the woman, especially fathers. 50 0 If Vuitch and Doe are to be taken literally, it seems that the
impact on fathers and family members should be taken into account.
Although Roe reserved the question of paternal rights in the abortion decision, 501 the Court has subsequently made clear that fathers
can not be given a veto power over a woman's decision to abort, es492 See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1073 (S.D. Ohio

1995).

491 See id at 1075.
494 See Appellees' Brief, supra note 205, at 32.
495 See Massie, supra note 321, at 367.
496 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
497 See BOYLE, supra note 294, at 105.
498See id at 125.
499 See Major, supranote 362, at 133.

5ooSee Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
"01See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 n. 67 (1973).
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pecially in the first trimester.50 2 Casey struck a spousal notification
50 3
requirement, on the grounds that it could lead to marital violence.
The Court agreed that marital harmony is a worthy ideal, but since
women bear the child, their rights had to be given priority.5 4 More
recent decisions by lower courts have also recognized
that paternal
50 5
rights are limited by the woman's liberty interest.
Even though paternal rights have been circumscribed in the abortion context, lawmakers can not deny the deep, overriding stake that
most fathers feel in the lives and welfare of their children. 506 That
stake may well be the greatest interest that the father has,50 7 and the
Court has been mindful of the profound detriment that an abortion can
have on a husband's mental well-being and the harmony of a marriage. 0 8 Men can especially suffer frustration and anguish when they
are marginalized in abortion decision-making. 50 9 The same is true
even for teen fathers.510 Perhaps consideration of the psychological
toll of abortion on men has been ignored because abortion has so often been justified in the name of the mother's health. This exclusive
focus on the woman's well-being, however, only makes sense if the
term "health" is confined to the physical context, because only the
woman's physical health is implicated by pregnancy. Once judges
reach into a woman's psyche to justify an abortion, though, they can
not logically distinguish the psychological impact on the mother from
that on the father. Courts have given this suffering little weight in
calculating health, however, and researchers have gathered extremely
little data on the subject.511

'02 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976); Casey, 505
U.S. at 898.
'03 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
'a"See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71; see also id at 90 (Stewart, 3., concurring).
"05See Coe v. County of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he Supreme Court
necessarily as well as explicitly weighed the woman's interest in reproductive freedom against
the man's interest in potential paternity, and found the former interest to be the weightier.");
Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 203 (D. Utah 1973) (three-judge panel) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
506 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895; Speckhard, supranote 361, at 96. But see RODMAN ET AL.,
supra note 379, at 81 (noting study results that abortion decision did not affect relationships
with male partners).
so7 See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 93 (White, ., dissenting).
'm See i. at 69-70.
5'o9
10 See BOYLE, supranote 294, at 126.
See Marecek, supranote 311, at 104.
51 See BOYLE, supranote 294, at 127; LAURiE N. SHERWEN, PSYCHOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS
OF THE PREGNANT FAMILY 157 (1987); Adler, Adolescent Abortion, supra note 312, at 89;
Arden Rothstein, Male Experience of Elective Abortion: Psychoanalytic Perspectives, in
PSYCHIATRIC ASPECrs OF ABORTION 146 (Nada L. Stotland, M.D. ed., 1991). There is also
virtually no data on the effect of the father's reaction on the mother's well-being. See Major,
supranote 362, at 134.
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The role that the psychological well-being of the child's father and
others in the woman's family should play in assessing her "health" is
unclear, but it should be given serious consideration when making
policy choices about a mental health exception. 5 12 States may well
have more of an interest in requiring paternal notification after viability, although it is difficult to conceive of how such a provision could
be drafted in a way that satisfies the Court's valid concern about domestic abuse. In any event, the reality of an overwhelming impact on
the well-being of the child's father should further detract from the
suggestion that abortions are a necessary or useful method of attaining maternal "health" in the Vuitch/Doe sense.
F. PhysicianDiscretion Under a Mental Health Exception
Erodes the State Interest in Practice
As noted in Part Ill, federal courts as a whole have traditionally
given physicians a virtual carte blanche to determine when an abortion is medically necessary. Various ways to phrase the exception
will be considered, but there is little reason to believe that any language permitting abortions on mental health grounds, no matter how
limited its wording, will be effective in standardizing abortion justifications in practice.
1. Physician Discretion Under a Mental Health Exception
Results in StandardlessDiagnosesof Health
Although forty-one states have adopted post-viability abortion
bans, many have argued that express or implied mental health exceptions have given physicians so much diagnostic discretion as to make
such laws worthless.513 Indeed, attorneys for the Voinovich Plaintiffs
admitted as much to the court in oral argument.5 14 When a doctor has
sole discretion to decide if a woman's health is at risk in the broad
Vuitch sense of the term, the state's interest in fetal life, while "compelling" enough to override the woman's liberty interest on paper, is
reduced to empty rhetoric in practice. 515 Abortions performed on
516
"health" grounds before the Roe decision bear out these concerns.
Alan Guttmacher was among those doctors who performed abortions

512

See Russo, PsychologicalAspects, supra note 297, at 625.

513NRLC, Testimony of DouglasJohnson, supranote 322.
514 See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 212 (6th Cir. 1997)

(Boggs, J., dissenting).
55 See Appellants' Brief, supranote 171, at 42.
516See Blumenthal, supra note 379, at 17-18.
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under the "thinly veiled lie" of safeguarding the woman's health.517
Even today, there are practitioners who
openly admit that they see
5 18
every abortion as medically necessary.
This practice continues because the Supreme Court has refused to
concede that doctors may abuse their discretion and provide abortions
for reasons that do not fall under the Court's or the state's definition
of "health." 51 9 Unfortunately, given the predominance of independent
clinicians among abortion providers, the Court's model of the "conscientious doctor" is not the norm. 2 0 Most abortion providers, while
conscientious persons, do not see their job as requiring a calm, detailed discussion of the woman's well-being, and most women do not
seek the doctor's counsel.52 1 Indeed, the uniform stand of clinicians
nationwide against any form of abortion regulation demonstrate a lack
of interest in seeking a holistic understanding of a woman's health,
and a predisposition towards abortion over alternatives. 522 The same
is true of most mental health professional organizations, such as the
American Psychological Association. Their public, corporate stances
that abortions, especially in the first trimester, are psychologically
unthreatening risk professional denial and make it difficult for individual practitioners to make contrary findings. 523 Instead, abortion
providers see themselves as simply providing a service, effectively
delegating their judicially enshrined diagnostic discretion to the
woman whose psychological distress has led her to seek the abortion
in the first place. 524 Thus, in many, if not most situations, a mental
health exception translates into abortion on demand.52
517

REARDON, supranote 335, at 165-67.
518
See Almeda, supranote 462, at 704.
519
See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196-97 (1973).
520
See REARDON, supra note 335, at 162.
521See id.

522
see id.
52 See Speckhard, supra note 361, at 97.
54 See REARDON, supra note 335, at 161. Some British doctors have interpreted their
health exceptions analogously. See CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM, supranote 207, at 118.
525
This situation parallels an analogous threat posed in another constitutional context-religious freedom. In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), lawyers for the State
of Oregon argued against allowing religious organizations unreviewable, individual discretion to
determine when they could use illegal substances in their ceremonies:
[D]enominational practices, and indeed individual believers ....can and do change
...the nature of their religious beliefs [and] of their doctrine .... If we exempt a
practice, even if we are presently satisfied by its safety, control passes forever into
private hands. [But] then we must ask, before we let that control pass in the form of
a constitutional exemption .... what are the contours of that exemption and how will
it be conferred. Because if the denominational or church controls weaken or change,
there are still enshrined in the Bill of Rights a permanent exception for the practices
of that religion.
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT.THE FIRST AMENDMENT 90 (Peter Irons ed., 1997) (quoting the
oral argument of David B. Frohmnayer, Attorney General of Oregon, before the Supreme Court
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Even for abortion providers who attempt to diagnose mental health
objectively, there is no agreed-upon means to predict the effect that a
birth or abortion will have on a given patient's psyche. 526 Moreover,
the person asked to make the diagnosis is often not a psychiatrist or
psychologist at all but rather is the same practitioner who will provide
the abortion. 527 Pregnant women need professionals trained to understand their situation if any type of reasoned diagnosis is to be expected.528 For these reasons, most psychiatrists agree that the task is
impossible,52and
prefer either a limitless mental health exception or
9
all.
at
none
Making the task even more difficult is the vested interest that
women have in exaggerating or faking psychiatric illness in order to
obtain an abortion. 530 Studies have found that women in the pre-Roe
era regularly faked suicidal tendencies and other psychiatric symptoms for this purpose, 531 even though evidence suggests that pregnancy dramatically lowers the overall suicide rate.532 Women were
533
often coached by others in how to fake these symptoms.
Despite this dilemma, a mental health exception gives psychiatrists almost limitless discretion to determine the medical need for an
abortion. 534 Because the woman is not a "patient" seeking holistic
counseling, but is visiting the psychiatrist only to achieve a very specific goal, the doctor-patient relationship is badly distorted.5 35 Under
these circumstances, it is nearly impossible for a counselor to be objective. 536 Whether a psychiatrist interprets a woman's apparent
symptoms as genuine or dishonest will necessarily be shaped by that
person's personal convictions
on abortion. 537 Indeed, pre-Roe studies
538
found exactly this result.

in Smith). Similarly, judicial delegation of the task of defining "health" to abortion providers
leaves states and courts powerless to prevent the subversion of the compelling state interest in
viable fetal life. Regardless of one's opinion of the ultimate holding in Smith, the Court agreed
with 52this logic then and should apply it to abortion jurisprudence as well.
See Schwartz, supranote 377, at 326.
527See Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 203 (D. Utah 1973) (three-judge panel) (Anderson, J., dissenting in part).
528See Blumenthal, supra note 379, at 24, 34; Sjdgren, supra note 334, at 823.
529
See SARVIS, supranote 374, at 118.
30
5 See RODMAN Er AL., supra note 379, at 74.
531See SARVIS, supranote 374, at 115.
532 See REARDON, supra note 335, at 168.
533See SARVIS, supranote 374, at 118.
"3 See RODMAN Er AL., supra note 379, at 73; SARVIS, supra note 374, at 114; Scott, supra
note 432, at 118.
535 See Stotland, supra note 449, at 2.
536See SARVIS, supranote 374, at 114.
137 See id. at 116.
538See Schwartz, supranote 377, at 327.
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Courts and legislatures have attempted to guide practitioners' discretion somewhat by articulating various standards for determining
when mental health is threatened by pregnancy. These rules, however, are as subject to interpretation and bending as the status quo.
2. A Mental Health Exception Is Impossible to Standardize
Even the earliest abortion laws attempted to narrow the range of
their mental health exceptions. Both the Uniform Abortion Act 539 and
the Model Penal Code 5 ° promulgated by the American Law Institute
allowed abortions only when the woman's mental health would have
been "gravely impaired." As discussed earlier, however, it was under
these laws that abortion providers like Alan Guttmacher were able to
provide virtual abortion on demand in the name of safeguarding
health.
Courts have not fared better in articulating standards. In 1980, the
Eastern District of Louisiana struck an exception for "permanent impairment of health," on the grounds that a woman whose pregnancy
was severely distressing, such as a rape or incest victim, would be
541
unable to prove that her short-term distress would be permanent.
Nonetheless, subsequent decisions in Utah54 2 and Indiana543 have construed mental health exceptions to only cover permanent disturbances.
The Sixth Circuit followed suit in Voinovich, deciding that the mental
health exception it would require of Ohio was limited to severe and
irreversible psychological damage. 544 Another version, the "severe
and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function" language of
Newman, was found to be too restrictive by the district court, 545 although substantially identical language was upheld in Casey and
modeled by the Ohio statute, as seen above. Finally, perhaps the most
broadly worded exception was the Clinton-backed Hoyer Amendment
to the Partial Birth Abortion Act, which would have5 4 permitted abortions "to avert serious adverse health consequences."
What any of these phrases mean, however, is still an open question. Congressman Hoyer, for what it was worth, explained his ex539 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. 146 (1973).
"4 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,205 (1973) (app. B).
541See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 196 (E.D. La. 1980).
42 See Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 202 (D. Utah 1973) (Anderson, J., dissenting in
part).
543 See A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Newman, 671 N.E.2d 104,
111 (Ind. 1996)
544 See Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187,209-10 (6th Cir. 1997).
545 See A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434,
1467 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
54 Rep. Henry Hyde, "Psychological Trauma," CONG. PRESS RELEASES, July 22, 1998,
available in NEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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ception as not allowing abortions for "a hangnail [or] a headache" but
for "psychological trauma." 547 NARAL has complained that any
"objective" standard would chill legitimate diagnoses and impede
professional judgment. 548 As seen above, though, the Supreme Court
indicated in Casey that the "bodily function" language could be construed to mean only physical health, and that this construction was
acceptable.5 49 In the end, defining health to mean only physical
health in the post-viability context may be the only practicable way to
standardize abortion practice and safeguard the state interest in fetal
health.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined both the legal and policy arguments
for and against construing the "life or health" exception to include a
woman's mental health. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly required such an exception, it has not contradicted the assumption of many federal and state courts that such an exception is
constitutionally required. With the Court's reordering of its abortion
jurisprudence in its 1993 Casey decision, and its reaffirmation of the
state's compelling interest in children who are physically capable of
enjoying a meaningful life outside of their mothers' wombs, however,
the time has come for the Court to dispel the notion that health must,
as a constitutional matter, mean whatever an individual abortion provider or patient wants it to mean in any given circumstance.
While medical researchers will never come to consensus on the
possible psychological motivations for-and side-effects fromabortion, courts and policymakers should take heed of the information
that is available. Despite their fundamental differences in political
and personal views of abortion, virtually all researchers to date have
agreed that the same symptoms that could cause a woman to suffer
psychologically if denied an abortion make her vulnerable to negative
emotional effects after obtaining an abortion. Put another way,
women who are psychologically vulnerable are at risk no matter how
they end their pregnancies. Mental health, then, can virtually never
be a reason to choose abortion over birth. By definition, women obtaining post-viability abortions are always among the groups at highest risk for these complications, which include those receiving late547
Id.
548See Appellees' Brief, supra note 205, at 4.
"49Likewise, the American Medical Association (AMA) gave its support to the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act because it had an exception to protect the woman's life. The AMA
never mentioned health, let alone mental health. See NRLC, AMA Letter (last modified May 19,
1997) <http://www.nrIc.orglamaletter.html> (reproducing a letter from the AMA).
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term abortions, the young, and those who are coerced into aborting.
The very idea of negative side-effects from abortion, moreover, is a
subject that seems to have been too politically taboo for serious political discussion for too long. ° Meanwhile, women suffer the very
tangible consequences.
Finally, as Casey suggests, courts and policymakers have a constitutional duty to take seriously our common interest in viable fetal
life. Regardless of where personal feelings and convictions may lie
on the right to abort in early pregnancy, society as a whole would do
well to conceptualize the termination of pregnancy after viability and
the destruction of a viable fetus as the two separate acts that they are.
The "state's" interest in a life that is capable of existing apart from its
mother is judicial shorthand for the societal decision to avoid the unnecessary destruction of life, and our own natural, moral impulses to
prefer life over non-life when the choice no longer poses a substantial
threat to the life-giver.
The mental well-being of any human being is an intimate element
of personhood, and its protection is an important and worthy goal.
But in our rush to assert individual, legal rights in the name of protecting that inner peace for one person, we as a society must not be
willing to extinguish the possibility of another human ever having the
chance to know what it is to be alive. We must not, especially without knowing with certainty that what we are doing will achieve its
purpose and is worth the price we will pay for it. In the case of mental health exceptions in post-viability abortion bans, we can not be
certain, and the price is a high one indeed. One judge on the Sixth
Circuit and three Justices of the Supreme Court have had the courage
to make that statement. Courts and lawmakers around the country
should follow their example.
BRIAN D. WASSOMt

55 See Speckhard, supra note 361, at 96.
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